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I. INTRODUCTION
Cases, even Supreme Court cases, interpreting statutes
have precedential value until there are subsequent material
changes in the statute. At that point, the case law must be reassessed to determine whether the changes in the statute impact the court’s statutory analysis. One should not blindly follow a case interpreting a statute without considering whether
the statute has been changed and, if so, the impact of any such
change.
This article deals with one such situation in the area of
medical device regulation and product liability preemption.1

1. We do not address whether preemption is good public policy or not. We
leave that debate to others. Rather, we argue that the Food Drug & Cosmetic
Act and Supreme Court authority must be applied consistently. Those that
believe preemption should be expanded or contracted should address their
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This article questions whether litigants and courts have ignored major statutory and regulatory changes in the FDA’s authority over medical devices and have too simplistically followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.2
We believe that this is exactly the situation and that the precedential value of Lohr is highly questionable.
At the forefront of technological innovation is the medical
device industry. Because of the rapid evolution of science, technology, and the health care system, the regulatory framework
governing medical devices changes frequently. As is expected,
the provisions of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) regulating medical devices have evolved substantially since 1938.3
Under the FDCA, as amended, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for ensuring that there is a “reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of devices intended for human use.”4 As described in more detail below, to
achieve the twin objectives of safety and effectiveness, Congress created three classes of medical devices based on risk.5
High risk, or Class III products, generally must obtain premarket approval from the FDA though the Pre-Market Approval (PMA) process.6 Medium risk products, or Class II products,
generally have a different pathway to market—the 510(k) system.7 Compared to the PMA system, the 510(k) system of the
FDCA creates a quicker and less expensive route for medical
devices to reach the market.8 Under § 510(k), a product is
cleared for market distribution if it is “substantially equivalent” to another device that has been cleared through the
510(k) process, a legally marketed pre-amendment device that
does not require a PMA, a device type that has been down-

concerns to Congress.
2. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
3. See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006), for the
up-to-date version of the Act.
4. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(C) (2006).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2006). Other sections of § 360c set forth the classification and reclassification process.
6. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e for a description of the PMA process.
7. The 510(k) process is described generally in 21 U.S.C. §360c. We recognize that some lower risk Class III devices are regulated under the 510(k)
system, some higher risk Class II products are required to go through the
PMA process, and some higher risk Class I products require a 510(k). For our
purpose these exceptions are not relevant to our analysis.
8. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (detailing the substantial equivalence requirements)
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classified from class III/PMA or to one that has been classified
through the de novo petition process into the 510(k) system.9
Section 510(k) is widely employed by medical device manufacturers and is responsible for many of the medical devices currently on the market. While yearly numbers vary, recently
there have been approximately forty to fifty original PMAs,
1400 supplemental PMAs and 3 to 4000 510(k)s received per
year.10 Class I devices are the lowest risk devices and generally
do not require any premarket authorization or clearance from
the FDA.11
Beginning in 2009, the 510(k) process has been under intensive review for a number of reasons. First, there was a highly public controversy involving the 510(k) clearance and then
rescission of the 510(k) substantial equivalence decision by
FDA of ReGen Menaflex, a medical device.12 The ReGen
Menaflex scandal together with some other highly public product issues led to allegations that the 510(k) process fails to protect patients.13 Second, a number of commentators and the
FDA itself concluded that it was time for a reassessment of the
510(k) system, at least in part, due to the ever increasing complexity of medical devices and the perceived aging of the 510(k)
system. In fact, in 2009, the FDA commenced a detailed assessment of the 510(k) process.14 Third, a new administration
9. Id.
10. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PERFORMANCE REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE
MEDICAL DEVICE USER FEE AMENDMENTS OF 2007, at 6, 20 (2009); OFF. OF
DEVICE EVALUATION, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 7 (2009). Note that the
number of original PMAs cannot be directly compared to the number of
510(k)s (as some commentators have tried to do) because a change in a PMA
product may go through the supplemental PMA process while a change in a
510(k) product triggers a new 510(k). There is no “supplemental” 510(k) analogous to the supplemental PMA process.
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c.
12. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REVIEW OF THE REGEN
MENAFLEX: DEPARTURES FROM PROCESSES, PROCEDURES, AND PRACTICES
LEAVE THE BASIS FOR REVIEW DECISION IN QUESTION—PRELIMINARY REPORT
(2009) (finding multiple departures from process, procedure and practices over
a seventeen year period).
13. FDA Questions Data Supporting Regen’s Menaflex Ahead of 510(k) ReDEVICES
TODAY
(Mar.
24,
2010,
5:17AM),
Review,
MED.
http://www.medicaldevicestoday.com/2010/03/fda-questions-data-supportingregens-menaflex-ahead-of-510k-rereview-.html.
14. Detailed information about the FDA’s assessment of the 510(k) system
and plan of action can be found at CDRH Plan of Action for 510(k) and Sci&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
ence,
U.S.
FOOD
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has taken the reins at the FDA. Given the 510(k) process’s important role in medical device use and development, it was considered imperative to assess whether the current statutory system ensures that 510(k) medical devices are both substantially
equivalent and safe and effective for their intended uses.15
Separately, two landmark Supreme Court cases have explored the difference between medical devices cleared via the
510(k) system and those approved under the PMA process.16
The two cases delved into the role FDA safety and effectiveness
determinations play in product liability suits. These cases arise
in situations in which the manufacturer/defendant has asserted
that the plaintiff’s claims are preempted under 21 U.S.C. §
360k.17 Section 360k preempts any state law requirement (including a jury verdict) that is “different from, or in addition to,”
a safety and effectiveness determination made by FDA.18
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Court ruled for the plaintiff
Lora Lohr, and it held that the FDA did not assess the safety
and effectiveness of the 510(k) medical device at issue in that
case as part of the 510(k) clearance process.19 The 510(k) process, the Court concluded, only focuses on the medical device’s
equivalence to another device, not the device’s safety and effectiveness.20 Therefore, the Court concluded that state law product liability claims against 510(k) devices are not preempted
under § 360k.
Roughly eleven years later, the Supreme Court heard a

http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTob
acco/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm239448.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). Details of the issues and proposed changes are generally outside of the scope of
this Article.
15. INST. OF MED., PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K)
CLEARANCE PROCESS: BALANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND INNOVATION—
WORKSHOP REPORT 1 (Theresa Wizemann, ed. 2010) [hereinafter October Report],
available
at
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2010/Public-HealthEffectiveness-of-the-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-Balancing-Patient-Safetyand-Innovation.aspx.
16. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
17. A finding of preemption generally precludes a judge or jury (federal or
state) from finding liability against the defendant under common product liability theories. There are situations in which the plaintiff can prevail even if
there is preemption. These include the “parallel claim” situations articulated
by Justice Scalia in Riegel, 552 U.S. at 313.
18. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
19. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470.
20. Id. at 493.
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similar case yet ruled instead for Defendant Medtronic.21 In
Riegel v. Medtronic, the Court found that the FDA made clear
safety and effectiveness findings for devices approved through
the PMA process.22 Medtronic’s medical device in Riegel—
which was approved through a PMA and not a 510(k)—was
found to be covered by the preemption provisions of § 360k.23
Therefore, the state law product liability claims asserted
against PMA medical devices are preempted by federal law.
Since these two cases, courts have generally found preemption for medical devices approved under the PMA process and
have refused to find preemption for medical devices cleared
through the 510(k) process.24
This article seeks to show that the statutory analysis in
Lohr is outdated and no longer applicable in product liability
suits against 510(k) medical devices due to material and significant statutory and regulatory changes in the 510(k) system
since the relevant date in Lohr. Because the FDA now makes a
determination of safety and effectiveness under the revised and
updated 510(k) clearance process, the core logic of Lohr is no
longer applicable.25 Part II of this Article provides a brief history surrounding the introduction of medical devices through the
PMA process and the 510(k) “substantially equivalent” standard. In particular, Part II focuses on two landmark cases, Lohr
and Riegel, and the role of each case in medical device product
liability suits. Part III of this Article then provides a different
interpretation to the arguments relied on in Lohr, in light of a
changing statutory framework. Part III also shows that FDA
itself (and some, but certainly not all interested stakeholders)
asserts that the 510(k) system does assess safety and effective21. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 312.
22. The PMA process is the most burdensome way for a medical device to
reach market. The PMA process requires an assessment that the medical device at issue is both safe and effective. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(A) (2006).
23. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
24. See, e.g., Lake v. TPLC., 1 F. Supp. 2d 84, 86 (D. Mass. 1998); Dow v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 899 F. Supp. 822, 823 (D. Mass. 1995).
25. In practice, the question of whether there is preemption in a specific
510(k) case will depend on the statutory system under which the product was
cleared. Of course, cases involving products cleared under the 510(k) system in
place at the relevant time period of Lohr are still governed by Lohr. Products
cleared under later iterations of the 510(k) process should be assessed under
those systems. For purposes of this article, we are looking at the two end
points of the spectrum—the 510(k) system as it existed in 1982 (the critical
date in Lohr) and today’s 510(k) system.
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ness for 510(k) devices.
Ultimately, this article makes two conclusions. First, Lohr
is not applicable to products cleared under the 2012 iteration of
the 510(k) system. Second, the current 510(k) system, § 360k,
and the rationale of Riegel suggest that—due to the safety and
effectiveness findings for 510(k) cleared devices—the standard
relied upon in Riegel should supersede that of Lohr for products
cleared under today’s 510(k) system.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION
Early medical devices did not present complex or serious
patient risks. Medical devices circa 1906 (the date of the original passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act) were essentially
acute use products that worked by obvious and simple mechanical processes.26 Crutches, scalpels, bed pans, syringes, and
bandages had obvious uses and simple requirements. The general adulteration and misbranding provisions of the Pure Food
and Drug Act applied to devices and provided ample protection
for patients. Even as late as 1938 (the date of the passage of
the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act), medical devices were still
generally simple mechanical devices.27 Because at this time devices also fit the statutory definition of a “drug,”28 the FDA
could use its general adulteration and misbranding provisions29
to address unsafe products or labeling issues. There was no
perceived need for a device premarket review system or other
device specific requirements.
Beginning in the 1960s, there was increasing attention on
the need to enhance the regulatory oversight of medical devices.30 Various proposals were floated. Perhaps the best known
and most important were the proposals set forth in the so-

26. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, §1, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed
1938). See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. A CENTURY OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION (Wayne L. Pines ed. 2006).
27. Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§321 to 399D (2006)). See generally FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 26.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2006); see also United States v. An Article of Drug .
. . Bacto-Unidisk, 89 S. Ct. 1410 (1969).
29. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–352 (2006).
30. PETER B. HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 977 (3d ed. 2007).
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called Cooper Commission report.31 The Commission was created in the late 1960s and charged with advising policy makers
about improvements to the device regulatory system.32 The
Cooper Commission proposed the core risk-based approach to
device regulation used today. Congress did not create specific
device centric requirements until the passage of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments (MDA). The MDA adopted a risk-based
approach designed to achieve a core statutory objective—
providing a reasonable assurance that medical devices are safe
and effective.33
Congress recognized that it would take some time for the
FDA to implement this system. In the meantime, new devices
were constantly being brought to the market. Congress did not
want to stifle the introduction of new products or give companies that got their products on the market immediately before
the passage of the 1976 MDA a monopoly while the new system
was being implemented.34 To address these concerns, Congress
enacted § 510(k).35 Under this section, one could market a device that was substantially equivalent to a product marketed
before the effective date of the MDA.36 Congress also authorized the FDA to create device centric performance standards for
510(k) products to ensure product safety and effectiveness.37
Over time, Congress, the FDA, and stakeholders recognized that performance standards were too confining, too hard
to develop, and could not address changing technology. Stakeholders also recognized that the PMA process was too long and
complex and did not add value or enhance the safety of a large
number of medium risk products. Further, unlike drugs, medi-

31. Id. at 977–80.
32. Id.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(C) (2006).
34. For a general background to the 1976 Medical Device Amendments,
see October Report, supra note 15, at 3–6. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
supra note 26.
35. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539.
36. Note that substantial equivalence does not mean being identical. The
standard is something that is more than similar but less than identical. For a
more thorough definition of “substantial equivalence,” see Premarket NotificaFOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/
tion
(510k),
U.S.
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Pre
marketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/default.htm (last updated
Sept. 3, 2010).
37. Cf. id.
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cal devices evolve in a fast paced, iterative pattern. Congress
concluded that the medical device regulatory system needed to
be updated and improved in order to enhance product safety
and effectiveness. The result was the Safe Medical Devices Act
of 1990 (SMDA).38 This was followed by the 1997 enactment of
the FDA Modernization Act (often referred to as FDAMA)39 and
then the 2002 enactment of the Medical Device User Fee and
Modernization Act (MDUFMA).40 These various statutory enactments substantially enhanced and further expanded the
FDA’s regulatory control over medical devices to better ensure
their safety and effectiveness.
1. Medical Device Amendments of 1976
The original FDCA granted the FDA specific authority over
medical devices.41 In 1976 the Medical Device Amendments
were adopted as a response to an increasing complexity, importance, and prevalence of medical devices on the market.42 A
key feature of the 1976 Amendments was FDA classification of
medical devices into three categories of regulatory controls:
Class I, Class II, and Class III.43 Each device, whether classified as Class I, II, or III, is subject to general controls44 or the
equivalence thereof.45 “Controls” are regulatory measures necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of the device.46
Simple devices (so-called Class I devices) are subject to on38. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511.
See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 26.
39. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296.
40. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-250, 116 Stat. 1588.
41. Prior to 1976, medical devices were regulated under the general adulteration and misbranding provisions of the FDCA (21 U.S.C. §§ 351 and 352
respectively). In some cases, the FDA regulated medical devices under the
drug provisions of the FDCA. See United States v. An Article of Drug . . .
Bacto-Unidisk . . ., (1969).
42. See October Report, supra note 15, at 3–6.
43. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006).
44. General controls can include registration and listing requirements,
compliance with quality system regulations (the so-called QSR requirements
generally found in 21 C.F.R. § 820 (2011)), and post market reporting obligations. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) for a more detailed description of general controls.
45. 21 U.S.C. § 360c.
46. Id.; see also Device Classification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 27,
2009),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm.
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ly general controls. Devices in Class I do not “present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury”47 and therefore are
deemed to have a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness provided that they satisfy general controls.48 No premarket review by the FDA is required prior to distribution.49
An example of a Class I device is an examination glove or elastic bandage.
General controls were not, by themselves, considered sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness for higher risk devices. Medium risk devices (Class II devices) were covered by performance standards and also by the
general controls of the type covering Class I devices.50 The original structure of the 510(k) system did not include many of the
hallmarks of the current 510(k) system. For example, special
controls are a key element of the current 510(k) system but
were not created until 1990.51 An example of a medium risk device is an infusion pump, which presents more risk and requires more safety measures than a Class I examination glove.
In addition to identifying classes for medical devices, the
Medical Device Amendments also created a regulatory structure—§ 510(k)—allowing many Class II, medium risk, post1976 devices to be cleared for marketing by demonstrating substantial equivalence to a device already on the market.52 The
510(k) system is in many ways a comparative system.53 The
new device is compared to an existing 510(k) product (referred

47. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
49. Jay H. Geller, Medical Device Amendments of 1976—Major Features
and Comparisons, 31 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 424, 424–28 (1976).
50. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2011).
51. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511.
52. In addition, a number of higher risk Class I devices are also regulated
under the 510(k) system. Congress also created a number of transitional processes to use as the 510(k) and PMA systems were being created and implemented. In many cases, these transitional provisions were designed to cover
products already on the market in 1976. These transitional provisions are not
relevant to this discussion.
53. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF: THE 510(K)
PROGRAM: EVALUATING SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN PREMARKET
NOTIFICATIONS [510(K)], at 6 (2011) [hereinafter DRAFT GUIDANCE], available
at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Guidan
ceDocuments/ucm282958.htm.
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to as the “predicate” device).54 The predicate has been determined to be safe and effective based on actual market use and
other experience. If the new device is comparable to the predicate, then it is viewed as having the same acceptable safety
profile.55 Substantial equivalence means the device has the
same intended use as the predicate and generally has the same
technological characteristics as the predicate device.56 If there
are different technological characteristics and those technological differences do not raise different questions of safety and effectiveness, the device manufacturer must submit data demonstrating that the device is as safe and as effective as the
predicate device.57 Substantial equivalence was to be interpreted narrowly in instances “where necessary to provide reasonable assurance of its safe and effective performance,” but substantially equivalent did not refer to only devices that were
“identical” to those already on the market.58.
High risk devices generally were to go through the PMA
process—in essence a version of the new Drug Application
(NDA) process created in 1962.59 These devices are ones for
which both general and special controls are insufficient to assure the safety and effectiveness of the device.60
Each level of control in the system was designed to provide
the necessary oversight and reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness. It was never the intent of Congress that some devices would have to have a “reasonable assurance” of safety and
effectiveness while others would not need to meet this standard. The objectives did not vary. Rather Congress used different means to achieve that objective.
2. Safe Medical Device Act of 1990
The first major post-1976 reformation of the FDCA was the
Safe Medical Device Act of 1990 (SMDA), which was adopted in
response to concerns that devices were not being adequately
regulated and in response to a number of mishaps in the medi54.
vant to
cates.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Premarket Notification (510k), supra note 36. In a few cases not relethis discussion, so-called “pre-amendment” devices can serve as prediSee id.
21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006).
Id.
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, §§ 514–515.
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
21 U.S.C. § 360c.
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cal device realm.61 The SMDA substantially expanded FDA authority over medical device regulation and increased burdens
on manufacturers of medical devices.62 Specifically, the SMDA
essentially rewrote the 510(k) process.63 A comparison of the
1976 statute and the current statute can be found in Appendix
A. From this comparison, one can see that the current statutory
framework imposes more safety and effectiveness requirements
on 510(k) medical devices.
First, the SMDA explicitly defined substantial equivalence
and substantially increased the robustness of the 510(k) system
as well as the regulatory use of “substantial equivalence.”64
Substantial equivalence now requires the device to have both
the same intended use and the same technological characteristics as the predicate device.65 If there is a new intended use, the
product is not eligible for clearance under the 510(k) system.66
Remember that the safety and effectiveness of the predicate is
a key basis for concluding that the new device has a reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness.
If the product is being used for a different purpose (a different disease for example) the comparison to the predicate is
not sufficient to show safety and effectiveness depending upon
the impact on safety and effectiveness, and therefore may be
found to be not substantially equivalent.67 If there are different
technological characteristics, the device manufacturer must
submit data—including, as necessary, clinical data—

61. E.g., Russell Mokhiber, The Dalkon Shield: A Deadly Product from
CRIME
&
VIOLENCE
(Apr.
1987),
A.H.
Robbins,
8
CORP.
http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1987/04/ahrobins.html; see also
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996) (citing the Dalkon Shield as
being one of several catastrophic events leading to the Safe Medical Device Act
of 1990).
62. Ellen J. Flannery, The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990: An Overview,
46 FOOD & DRUG COSM. L.J 129, 129 (1991).
63. See id. at 131−33.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006).
65. Id. § 360c(i).
66. Id. A “denial” of a 510(k) submission is often referred to as a “not substantial equivalence” or “NSE” determination. See DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra
note 53, at 4. A product found to be NSE must either obtain a PMA approval
under 21 U.S.C. § 360e or, much less commonly, go through the “de novo” process under 21 U.S.C. §360c(f) and then, if it meets all regulatory requirements,
be classified as 510(k) eligible and then be determined as substantially equivalent (or “SE”).
67. 21 U.S.C. 360c(i).
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demonstrating that the device is as safe and as effective as the
predicate device.68 Particularly, the statute specifically allows
the FDA to request clinical data when the new device has technological changes as compared to the predicate device.69 If the
new technolobical characteristics raise different questions of
safety and effectiveness, the 510(k) for the device will be found
to be not substantially equivalent.70
In addition, the SMDA added a new regulatory control
mechanism. Medium risk devices were also now made subject
to “special controls” because “the general controls by themselves are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the
safety and effectiveness of the device.”71 Special controls can include the 510(k) clearance process, performance standards,
clinical data, bench data, post market studies, and registries.72
After the SMDA, a device demonstrating substantial
equivalence did not have to have a pre-1976 device as a predicate. Any manufacturer can receive 510(k) clearance, so long as
the device is proven to be substantially equivalent to a 510(k)
device already determined by the FDA to be substantially
equivalent.73 After the SMDA, a predicate device could be a device cleared through the 510(k) process, a device that was marketed prior to May 28, 1976 (a pre-amendment device), or a device that was originally on the U.S. market as a Class III PMA
device and later reclassified as a 510(k) device.74
Additionally, manufacturers of medical devices requiring
510(k) must submit either a 510(k) summary of safety and effectiveness data to be reviewed by FDA or a 510(k) statement.75
Another important change promulgated by the SMDA was
the modification of pre-1976, Class III high risk devices regulation. The original 1976 Amendments directed the FDA to conduct premarket approvals for Class III devices already on the
market after they had been classified by the agency for at least

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii) (2011).
71. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
72. Id.
73. See Id. § 360c(i) (“‘[S]ubstantial equivalence’ means, with respect to a
device being compared to a predicate device . . . .”). Note that the language of
the statute does not include a requirement that the predicate device be pre1976.
74. October Report, supra note 15, at 82–84.
75. Flannery, supra note 62, at 149.
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thirty months;76 in reality, at that time, few premarket approvals were actually called for under § 515(b) and performed for
those devices.77 As a result, many pre-1976 Class III devices
never completed a premarket approval and were never determined to be safe and effective.78 Thus, devices “substantially
equivalent” to pre-1976 Class III devices were purported to be
substantially equivalent in all respects, including safety and
effectiveness of which there was no actual proof.79 The SMDA
changed this. After enactment, the SMDA required manufactures of pre-1976 Class III device types still subject to 510(k) to
submit a detailed summary including adverse data relating to
the safety and effectiveness of the device type in their 510(k).80
The FDA then was to consider whether to reclassify the pre1976 devices based on the level of regulation needed to provide
a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.81 If a product remained in Class III, the manufacturer was required to obtain a premarket approval for such devices.82 As a result, the
SMDA substantially modified the 1976 system to better ensure
the safety and effectiveness of all medical devices hitting the
market after 1990. The Act demonstrates both Congress’s and
the FDA’s increased focus on safety.
3. FDA Modernization Act
In 1997, Congress passed the FDA Modernization Act
(FDAMA). This statute was intended to—among other purposes—better regulate medical devices and to ensure that there
was an appropriate balance between safety and patient access
to medical devices.83 FDAMA instituted a number of changes in
medical device statutory regulation including the creation of
“good guidance practices” (GGPs) and the enactment of the
“least burdensome” principle.84 FDAMA further demonstrates
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 515.
Flannery, supra note 62, at 135.
Id.
See id.
Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (2006).
Flannery, supra note 62, at 135−36.
21 U.S.C. § 360c(i).
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF DEVICE EVALUATION & CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, THE LEASE BURDENSOME PROVISIONS
OF THE FDA MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997: CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES; FINAL
GUIDANCE FOR FDA AND INDUSTRY 1 (2002).
84. Id. at 2 (defining the least burdensome principle as “a successful
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that Congress has exercised active oversight of the device regulatory system.
4. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002
In 2002, Congress enacted the Medical Device User Fee
and Modernization Act Congress intended MDUFMA to give
the FDA resources to “better review medical devices, to enact
needed regulatory reforms so that medical device manufacturers can bring their safe and effective devices to the American
people at an earlier time, and to ensure that reprocessed medical devices (those disposable devices reprocessed for another
single use) are as safe and effective as original devices.”85
MDUFMA has since enabled the FDA to better assess medical
devices, ensuring their safety and effectiveness.86 The enactment of MDUFMA has allowed the FDA to place more time and
resources towards medical device review.87
B. CURRENT METHODS FOR REACHING MARKET88
Currently, a medical device has three methods of reaching
market. First, most low risk/Class I devices, such as tongue depressors and many in vitro diagnostic devices, do not require
any 510(k) clearance before market if they meet the criteria in
section 510(l) of the FDCA and do not add a new use or new
fundamental technology in comparison to the legally marketed
Class I device type.89 General controls are considered adequate
to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness
of Class I devices.90 Second, a high risk medical device (generally Class III) that has not been classified into Class I or Class II
and whose risks and how to mitigate those risks are not under-

means of addressing a premarket issue that involves the most appropriate investment of time, effort, and resources on the part of industry and FDA”); see
also 21 C.F.R. 10.115 (2012).
85. Background on MDUFMA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/
MedicalDeviceUserFeeandModernizationActMDUFMA/ucm109149 (last updated Mar. 2, 2009).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Section B outlines the FDA’s current process for medical device review; this is to be distinguished from Section A, which discussed the FDA review process as it stood in 1976. See Appendix A for a detailed table comparing the 1976 FDCA with the current FDCA.
89. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2011)
90. Id.
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stood well enough to identify Special Controls to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device
type, may reach market via the PMA route if the manufacturer
can demonstrate to the FDA that their device is safe and effective for its intended use.91 Thirdly, a manufacturer can seek
clearance via the 510(k) system for medium risk products/mostly Class II devices, by meeting all relevant regulatory
requirements and by showing “substantial equivalence.”92
1. Braving the Premarket Approval Process
The PMA process is a regulatory review specifically evaluating the safety and effectiveness of a specific medical device.93
Before a device manufacturer can market its Class III/PMA
medical device, it must obtain FDA approval.94 The PMA process is the most rigorous process for a medical device to reach
market. First, the manufacturer must complete the PMA application.95 The PMA application requires non-clinical laboratory
studies and clinical investigations to be submitted to the FDA;
both are time consuming and expensive.96 The studies must be
sufficiently thorough to provide reasonable assurance that the
device is safe and effective for the intended use.97
Once the application is submitted to the FDA, the device
manufacturer must wait for review and approval before its device can be marketed.98 The time taken to respond to PMA applications is significantly longer compared to manufacturers
91. Id.
92. Clinical (or pre-market) studies of medical devices on human subjects
are governed by the Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) process under 21
U.S.C. §360e(j) (2006). The IDE process requires FDA and Institutional Review Board approval of the clinical study to ensure patient protection (including safety) and the scientific value of the study. See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 54,
312 (2011).
93. Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMar
ketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/default.htm
(last updated Jan. 24, 2012). PMAs are required for all Class III medical devices and some Class II devices.
94. Id. In addition to the statutory provisions, the FDA has enacted a
number of implementing regulations. PMA regulations are generally found in
21 C.F.R. § 814 (2011).
95. Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 93.
96. See 21 C.F.R § 814.20 (2011).
97. Id.
98. Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 93.
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who seek clearance through a showing of substantial equivalence. For example, if a manufacturer submits a 510(k) it takes,
on average, seventy-three days of FDA time for the FDA to
make a decision99 compared to an several hundred days for a
PMA.100 Overall, the PMA process is more expensive and takes
more time than clearance through § 510(k). For these reasons,
manufacturers frequently attempt to gain FDA clearance under
510(k) rather than approval through a PMA if the device type
has not already been classified as a PMA. 101
2. Reaching Market Through a Showing of Substantial
Equivalence Under § 510(k)
Class I and Class II devices that are not exempt from the
510(k) requirements of the FDCA must obtain 510(k) clearance
before marketing. The actual statutory provisions governing
the 510(k) process are complex and not susceptible to instant
understanding. The 510(k) system has been built over time
with Congress and the FDA adding new requirements or processes.102
Establishing equivalence under 510(k) is faster, cheaper,
and far less burdensome than the PMA process. In order to be
classified as substantially equivalent, the device must pass

99. Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, Analysis of Premarket Review
Times Under the 510(k) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTob
acco/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm263385.htm (last updated Nov. 09, 2011). Note
that their time frames do not include the days spent by industry in responding
to FDA questions.
100. GAO CONFIRMS TOTAL DEVICE DECISION TIMES TAKING LONGER, FDA
NOT MEETING SOME GOALS, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=9f722b
64-1d0d-4905-9efb-3b5b6871c145. Statutorily, the FDA must respond to PMA
applications in 180 days after submission. 21 C.F.R. § 814.42 (2011). In practice, however, the FDA takes much longer. For example, if an amendment to
the application is submitted, the 180 day clock restarts. CTR. FOR DEVICES &
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, FDA AND INDUSTRY ACTIONS ON PREMARKET
APPROVAL APPLICATIONS (PMAS): EFFECT ON FDA REVIEW CLOCK AND GOALS
7 (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Device
RegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm089734.pdf.
101. See October Report, supra note 15, at 9 (explaining that substantial
equivalence “allow[s] products to go to market quickly with appropriate safeguards,” which makes them an attractive option for device manufacturers).
102. As discussed earlier, key statutory changes occurred in 1976, 1990,
1997, and 2002. Lesser changes were made at different times. In addition, over
time the FDA promulgated new regulations, guidance documents and standard operating procedures.
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through a series of checkpoints.103 First, the manufacturers
must identify a legally marketed predicate device. Second, the
manufacture must demonstrate that the device has the same
intended use as the predicate device.104 If the device does not
have the same intended use as its predicate, the device is “not
substantially equivalent” (NSE) within the meaning of
§ 510(k).105 Next, the medical device must have matching technological characteristics as the predicate device.106 If the technological characteristics are different from those of the predicate device in such a way that may have an effect the device’s
safety and effectiveness, the FDA will assess whether those differences in technology raise any safety and effectiveness concerns or questions.107 The product, if Class II, must also comply
with all applicable special controls, including any mandatory
performance standards.108
The FDA is permitted by statute to request data from clinical trials demonstrating that the device is both as safe and as
effective as the predicate device. 109 The data also aids the FDA
in its substantial equivalence determination.110
So long as no new type of safety and effectiveness questions are raised, the 510(k) submitter meets all regulatory requirements, and “accepted scientific methods [are available] for
assessing the effects” of the device, the FDA will clear the device.111
One cannot simply talk about, or draw conclusions about,
103. An overview of the process and decision points can be found in various
FDA guidance documents. For an example, see DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note
53. A recent draft update to the 1998 guidance reiterates these decision points.
104. Benjamin A. Goldberger, Note, The Evolution of Substantial Equivalence in FDA’s Premarket Review of Medical Devices, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
317, 323–24 (2001) (describing the process a device seeking clearance through
510K must pass).
105. See id. at 324.
106. Id.; see also Janice Hogan & Gwyn Simmons, Standards for Clearance
of 510K Premarket Notifications in the US, RAJ DEVICES, 311–12 (Sept./Oct.
2008), http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/c6c923f0-742a-4b63-be7aeb10fc689261/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/db563313-55cf-4519-9c8a1417ccd17afb/RAJ.pdf (“[T]echnological characteristics [may include] design,
materials and energy sources . . . .”).
107. Hogan & Simmons, supra note 106, at 311–12.
108. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a), 360d (2006).
109. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A).
110. Id.
111. Goldberger, supra note 104, at 324.
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the 510(k) system as one system throughout time. Rather, one
must consider the system as it existed at the time the particular 510(k) submission was reviewed by the FDA. Conclusions
about the nature of the 510(k) system as it existed in 1982 may
well not be applicable to the 510(k) system as it exists today.
This, we contend, is the fundamental challenge with the rote
citation to Lohr for the proposition that today’s 510(k) system
does not assess safety and effectiveness.
C. PREEMPTION IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE CONTEXT.
1. Federal Preemption of State Claim Under § 360k of the
FDCA
Preemption is the legal doctrine that federal requirements
override similar state or local legal requirements.112 There are
three general types of preemption. Express preemption requires an explicit Congressional enactment.113 In these cases,
the statutory language and Congressional intent define the
boundaries and parameters of preemption.114 Implied preemption exists in situations in which Congress has so occupied a
specific subject that courts conclude that Congress intended
federal law to be the sole set of requirements.115 Conflict
preemption (also called impossibility preemption) exists when a
person or entity cannot comply with both a federal requirement
and a state requirement.116 If a person or entity literally cannot
comply with both federal and state requirements, federal requirements predominate.
From the beginning of medical device regulation with the
enactment of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Congress exercised its power under the Supremacy Clause and expressly preempted state-created medical device requirements.
Section 360k(a) prohibits states from establishing device
112. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
113. See Nanopierce Tech. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 168 P.3d
73, 79 (Nev. 2007) (“Congress expressly preempts state law when it explicitly
states that intent in a statute’s language.”).
114. See id.
115. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
116. Id.
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requirements additional to or different from those required by
the FDA: Section 360k(a) reads:
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this Act.117

This provision, enacted as a part of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments, preempts state claims which establish either
additional requirements or different requirements relating to
the safety and effectiveness of devices under the FDCA. FDA’s
implementing regulations limit preemption to situations in
which the agency has device specific requirements and does not
cover so-called “general requirements,” such as zoning laws,
building codes, and tax obligations.118 In essence, § 360k
preempts any state court requirement, including court cases,
which impose or seek to impose requirements on medical devices in situations in which the FDA has created or has the authority to create device specific requirements relating to safety
and effectiveness.
While the Court in Lohr established that § 360k(a) “expressly preempts state law, “it acknowledged that § 360k(a)
was not intended to preempt all state laws and regulations.119
The Court reasoned that “any understanding of the scope of a
preemption statute must rest primarily on ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose.’”120 “Congress’ intent, of course,
primarily is discerned from the language of the pre-emption
statute and the ‘statutory framework’ surrounding it.”121
2. Court Analysis in Medtronic v. Lohr
The Supreme Court first applied preemption to medical
devices under § 360k in 1996 in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr. The
117. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
118. 21 C.F.R § 808.1(b), (d) (2011).
119. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996); see 21 U.S.C. §
360k(a).
120. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485–86 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530).
121. Id. at 486 (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n,
505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
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device at issue in Lohr was the lead for a cardiac pacemaker—a
wire responsible for carrying electric impulses or signals to and
from the heart. 122 Medtronic produced the pacemaker lead, and
the FDA cleared it for distribution under the 510(k) process of
the MDA.123 The device was cleared by the FDA in 1982.124 Due
to an alleged defect in the lead, the pacemaker system failed
several years after it was implanted.125 The plaintiffs sued
Medtronic asserting common law product liability theories.126
Medtronic argued that the plaintiff’s defective device claim was
preempted under the FDCA, asserting that “federally enforceable design requirement[s] cannot be affected by state-law pressures such as those imposed on manufacturers subject to product liability suits.”127 The Court rejected this claim and
ultimately held that, because the 510(k) process that was in
place when the device was reviewed by the FDA does not focus
on safety and effectiveness, but rather on equivalence, the
plaintiff’s defective device claim was not preempted by federal
law.128
3. History of the Pacemaker Lead in Dispute
The pacemaker system at the center of the Lohr dispute
was a Model 8403 Activitrax with a Model 4011 lead.129 In
1980, Model 4011 leads were classified as Class III devices.130
Shortly thereafter, in 1982, Medtronic submitted an application
to have a Model 4011 lead cleared through 510(k), claiming
substantial equivalence to a pre-1976 device.131 Approximately
one month later, the FDA allowed Medtronic to “market the
Model 4011 lead subject only to the MDA’s Class I general con122. Id. at 493 (ultimately determining that the 510k process does not assess the safety of the device, but just the device’s equivalence to its predicate).
123. Id. at 474.
124. Id. at 480.
125. Id. at 474.
126. Id. at 481.
127. Id. at 492.
128. Id. at 503.
129. Mary Elizabeth Phelen, When a Pacemaker Or Other Medical Device
Fails: Does Federal Law Deprive Those Injured of Their State Law Remedies?,
1995–1996 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 365, 366. A pacemaker lead “is a wire
connected to the pacemaker that delivers the electrical impulse to the heart.”
Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. (demonstrating that, given the timeline, neither the preamendment pacemaker, nor the pacemaker cleared through the substantial
equivalence process were ever reviewed for safety and effectiveness).
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trols applicable to all devices.”132 Medtronic continued making
leads, piggy-backing on predecessors and obtaining clearances
through the 510(k) system.133 As summarized in a 1992 government report that reviewed multiple failures of Medtronic
pacemakers, the FDA never determined Medtronic’s 4011 leads
to be either safe or effective.134 Ms. Lohr was implanted with
Medtronic’s pacemaker system using the 4011 lead in 1987.135
Medtronic’s central defense in Lohr was an assertion of
federal preemption under § 360k(a) of the FDCA.136 Medtronic
asserted that Lohr’s design claim was preempted because the
FDA, by way of clearance under 510(k), already promulgated
federally enforceable design requirements for Medtronic’s
pacemaker.137 Therefore, Medtronic argued, Lohr’s action for
negligent design was attempting to enforce an additional and
contrary requirement to an FDA established requirement.138 In
rejecting Medtronic’s preemption argument, the Court concluded that the 510(k) process did not assess safety or efficacy of
the device and that manufacturers entering the market under
510(k) clearance should expect “the possibility that [they will]
have to defend [themselves] against state-law claims of negligent design.”139 Additionally, the Court found the “general controls” governing the pacemaker lead were not “specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act,” but
instead were generic provisions that apply to all devices regulated under the FDCA.140
Given that the device in question was cleared by the FDA
in 1982, the Court in Lohr only mentions the 1990 SMDA in

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 367. Just to note, the SMDA required pre-1976 device manufacturers to submit safety and effectiveness reports for review by FDA. Before the
SMDA, the safety and effectiveness of many pre-1976 devices was undetermined. Cf. Section II.A.2 detailing the SMDA.
136. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 494.
140. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2011); Suzanne Darrow Kleinhaus, Medtronic v.
Lohr: For Want of a Word, the Patient Was Almost Lost—Fixing the Mischief
Caused in Cipollone by Dividing the Preemption Stream, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J.
297, 305 (1998); see also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500 n. 18 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)
(1995)).
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passing and certainly does not analyze preemption under the
post-SMDA regulatory system. Lohr left open the question of
whether products going through the PMA process under 21
U.S.C. § 360e were entitled to preemption. This question was
answered by the Supreme Court in 2008.
D. HOLDING IN RIEGEL V. MEDTRONIC, INC.
In 2008, the Supreme Court again applied preemption to a
medical device product liability claim in Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc.141 The device at the center of the dispute in Riegel was an
Evergreen Balloon Catheter used for an angioplasty procedure
for Charles Riegel in 1999.142 The catheter was a Class III device and received FDA approval under the PMA process in
1994.143 The catheter’s labeling specified that the catheter
should not be used in patients with calcified stenosis.144 Mr.
Riegel had calcified stenosis.145 Furthermore, the physician was
instructed not to inflate the balloon beyond eight atmospheres
of pressure.146 Contrary to what the label of the catheter instructed, Riegel’s catheter was inflated five times to ten atmospheres—well above the recommended pressure.147 On the fifth
time, the balloon burst, injuring Mr. Riegel.148 As a result, a
heart block developed and emergency coronary bypass surgery
was required.149 Mr. Riegel brought suit against Medtronic alleging design defects and labeling problems in violation of New

141. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
142. Id. at 312 . Angioplasty is a procedure during which blocked coronary
arteries are opened by inflating a balloon inside the arterial blockage thus
forcing the artery open. The balloon is attached to a catheter and inserted into
the appropriate coronary artery. The balloon is then inflated opening the artery. Once the artery is open, the catheter and attached balloon are removed.
See What is Coronary Angioplasty?, NAT’L HEART LUNG & BLOOD INST.,
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/angioplasty/ (last visited
Apr. 4, 2012).
143. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 312. The Court described the PMA process as including, among many other facets, a thorough evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the device. Id. at 318. The Court also noted that once a device is
approved through PMA, the FDA “forbids . . . changes in design specifications .
. . or any other attribute . . . .” Id. at 319.
144. Id. at 320.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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York common law.150
In contrasting the facts of the situation in Riegel with
those in Lohr, the Riegel Court found that “premarket approval
is specific to individual devices” and “is focused on safety, not
equivalence.”151 Since Mr. Riegel’s product liability claims focused on the safety and effectiveness of the catheter, and the
FDA already specified requirements for that same catheter, the
Court concluded the New York common law imposed different
or additional requirements on the device.152 The FDCA was
thus found to preempt Riegel’s claim for negligent design and
faulty product labeling.153
E. PROMINENT FDA PREEMPTION DECISIONS AFTER RIEGEL
In a recent Supreme Court case, Wyeth v. Levine, the Court
again faced a question of federal preemption in a product liability suit.154 In Wyeth, the FDA approved drug—Phenergan—
presented an increased risk of gangrene if used by injection rather than intravenous drip.155 Phenergan contained an adequate warning label per FDCA requirements; yet, when the
plaintiff lost her arm due to gangrene, the FDCA was found not
to preempt a state law product liability claim.156 At first blush,
the holding in Wyeth seems contrary to the holding in Riegel.
The key difference is that medical device preemption cases are
analyzed under express preemption concepts due to § 360k.
Drug cases are analyzed under implied preemption concepts.157
The Court in Wyeth explicitly noted that a drug equivalent
preemption provision to the medical device preemption set
forth in § 360k(a) was non-existent.158 In citing Riegel, the
150. Id.
151. Id. at 323.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 323–24.The Court in Riegel did not discuss the impact of the
1990 SMDA on 510(k) preemption.
154. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558 (2009).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 573–81.
157. The specific differences between express and implied preemption have
been addressed by courts and commentators. Given that we focus on § 360k
and express preemption, these differences are not relevant to our analysis.
158. Section 360k preempts a state from supplying additional or contrary
requirements for medical devices. Contra Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stating that it was possible for Wyeth to label Phenergan in compliance with the FDA regulations and also provide additional warnings re-
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Court concluded that in an implied preemption case, unless
there was a “direct and positive conflict” between state law and
the FDCA, state common law suits were not preempted.159 In
Wyeth, the Court determined it was possible for the drug manufacturer to comply with both state and federal law.160 While the
FDA has authority to reject the drug label change, the drug
manufacturer, not the FDA, is responsible for maintaining its
labeling. It is important to distinguish drug and device cases.
Wyeth concerned a drug, not a device; medical device preemption is analyzed under express preemption concepts and § 360k.
Conversely, drug preemption is analyzed under implied
preemption doctrine, and devices and drugs have unique regulatory structures.
In PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, another federal preemption
case, two consumers brought a products liability action under
state tort law against a generic drug manufacturer.161 They alleged that the manufacturer failed to provide adequate warnings on their generic drug labels.162 The key issue in Mensing
was whether a generic drug manufacturer could change their
drug’s labeling in accordance with state law requirements after
initial FDA approval.163 Under FDA regulation, a generic drug
manufacturer must contact the FDA if they believe new safety
information should be added to their drug’s label.164 The FDA

quired by the state). This is unique to drugs as they have their own regulatory
scheme.
159. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567 (quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S.
312, 342 (2008)); see also Matthew S. Reid, Comment, Vermont Supreme Court
Rules That Food and Drug Administration Regulations Do Not Preempt State
Failure-to-Warn Claims—Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006)., 4 J.
HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 413, 420 (2008) (noting that the FDA regulation of drug
labeling only sets a floor; states’ requirements imposing greater labeling requirements for drugs are enforceable); see generally 21 C.F.R § 314.70 (2011)
(codifying minimum requirements for drug labels).
160. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568. In particular, the court focused on the “changes being effected” or “CBE” provisions found in 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6). Id.
161. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011).
162. Id. State tort law—Minnesota and Louisiana in this case—requires “a
drug manufacturer that is or should be aware of its product’s danger to label
that product in a way that renders it reasonably safe.” Id. at 2573.
163. Id. at 2574. Just to note, under FDA regulations, generic drugs must
have identical labels to their name brand counterparts. See Abbreviated New
Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17950-01 (Apr. 28, 1992) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 2, 5, 10, 310, 314, 320, & 433)
164. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 1795001 (Apr. 28, 1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 2, 5, 10, 310, 314, 320, & 433).
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then determines if the drug labeling should be strengthened.165
Due to these FDA requirements, the Court in Mensing found
conflict preemption; it was impossible for the generic drug
manufacturer to comply with state law and strengthen their
warning, while remaining in compliance with the federal
law.166
Mensing raised an additional question as to whether conflict preemption should consider situations where the FDA had
the authority to act but did not act. For example, in Mensing
the appellees argued that successfully proving preemption requires the generic drug manufacturer to show that the FDA
would not have allowed compliance with both state and federal
law.167 In this case, it was at least possible that the FDA would
have allowed the generic drug manufacturer to strengthen
their drug label had they asked the FDA.168 The Court ruled,
however, that the Supremacy Clause does not permit this approach to preemption. “The Supremacy Clause, on its face,
makes federal law ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ even absent
an express statement by Congress.”169 The Court ultimately
held that federal law preempted the state law that required a
change in the generic drug company’s label, despite the fact
that the FDA had the authority to approve a stronger warning
label.170
III. ANALYSIS
A. SUMMARY OF PREEMPTION ELEMENTS UNDER § 360K AND
RELEVANT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
If one consolidates the medical device related preemption
statutory elements under § 360k, the FDA’s implementing regulations under 21 C.F.R. § 808, and relevant Supreme Court
jurisprudence, one can derive a core set of requirements or el-

165. Id.
166. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. at 2577–79. “The question for ‘impossibility’ is
whether the private party could independently do under federal law what
state law requires of it.” Id. at 2579. In Mensing, the generic drug manufacturer could not strengthen its label in accordance with state law and still be in
compliance with federal law. Id.
167. Id. at 2578–79
168. Id. at 2587.
169. Id. at 2579.
170. Id. at 2582.
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ements that must be satisfied before the courts will accept a
preemption defense.171
1. Required Preemption Elements
First, the FDA must have the authority to impose safety
and effectiveness related requirements on the device in question.172 Section 360k preempts a state requirement that “relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.”173 The core finding in Lohr was that the FDA,
at the time it cleared Medtronic’s 4011 lead, did not impose, or
have the authority to impose, safety and effectiveness requirements on the product. The Lohr Court found that the FDA had
not made a safety or effectiveness determination when it
cleared the pacemaker lead at issue. Conversely, in Riegel, the
Supreme Court held that the PMA system in place when the
catheter at issue in that case was approved did make a safety
and effectiveness determination.174 Thus, one key element for a
preemption defense is to establish that the regulatory system
through which the product was permitted to be marketed
makes, or has the authority to make, a safety and effectiveness
determination.175

171. It is not our intent to debate or analyze the correctness of the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of § 360k in Lohr or Riegel. We recognize that some (including some dissenting judges) question various aspects of Supreme Court
preemption jurisdiction. For example, there have been debates whether a state
product liability verdict is a “requirement” within the meaning of the “parallel
claim” language in Riegel; whether there should be preemption for IDE products; or what is the relationship of preemption cases such as Riegel to
Buckman v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee, and Buckman’s “fraud on the FDA”
language. See Buckman v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
172. The issue of whether the FDA has the authority to impose requirements is different from the question whether a state court product liability
verdict is a “requirement” for preemption purposes. In several cases, including
Lohr and Riegel, the Supreme Court determined that state court product liability verdicts can be “requirements” for preemption purposes.
173. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(2) (2006).
174. See Section II.E. Preemption applies if the agency has the statutory
and regulatory authority necessary to satisfy the requirements of § 360k.
Preemption applies even if the agency makes the wrong safety or effectiveness
determination or otherwise inadequately implements the statutory authority
given it. Preemption is a question of agency authority, not agency implementation or agency decision-making.
175. Because product liability cases almost universally involve questions of
safety, the role of the regulatory system in making effectiveness determinations is rarely an issue.
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Second, the agency must have the authority to impose the
regulatory requirements that are specific to the device. For example, in Lohr, the defendant argued that the “general controls”176 applicable to the pacemaker lead were safety and effectiveness determinations. The Court rejected this argument
because, in the Court’s opinion, general controls applied to all
devices without regard for the particular nature or features of
the actual device.177 Conversely, the Supreme Court held that
the PMA requirements at issue in Riegel were specific to the
device because each PMA individually analyzes a device and so
satisfied this element of preemption. In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked at the statutory provisions178 requiring a
safety and effectiveness determination by the FDA for any
PMA submission and the content of the application and approval documents.179 The Court was also heavily influenced by
the fact that the company could not make product changes
without prior FDA review and approval.180
Cases such as Wyeth and Mensing turned on whether the
company could modify the product in question or the product
labeling without prior FDA approval. The idea is that the inability of the company to unilaterally make product changes
demonstrates both that the FDA is fully occupying the field (a
necessary part of implied or field preemption) and demonstrates that the proposed change in the product is a new requirement that is different from or in addition to FDA requirements—a key element of preemption under § 360k. The statute
(§ 360k) itself does not explicitly create this “specificity” element. The statute simply talks about safety and effectiveness.
The Court in Lohr used the FDA’s implementing regulations as a key basis for the specificity requirement. Chapter 21

176. General controls include manufacturing systems (so-called good manufacturing practices (GMPs)), quality system regulations (QSRs), and facility
and device registration. The role of general controls in product safety is set
forth in 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
177. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1996).
178. 21 U.S.C. § 360e sets out detailed requirements for the content of a
PMA submission and the criteria by which the agency approves or rejects the
application.
179. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 313 (2008).
180. Contra Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1196 (2009) (discussing how
a drug company was able to make changes to the drug labeling without FDA
approval through the CBE regulation). The CBE provision is not available to
device manufacturers under the 510(k) provisions.
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C.F.R. § 808.1(d) states:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and
Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations
or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition
to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements.

In addition, in its implementing regulations, the FDA explicitly stated that state requirements that are of general applicability are not preempted by § 360k.181 The purpose of the
“specificity” requirement appears to be to permit local nondevice requirements to be effective. Examples of requirements
of general applicability include local zoning requirements, electrical codes, and permitting requirements.
These regulatory and statutory provisions, together with
the Court’s overall view on preemption, led to the Court asserting that in order for there to be preemption, the FDA must impose, or have the power to impose, device specific requirements
relating to safety and effectiveness.
Many medical device preemption cases involve allegations
that the product should have warnings or safety features not
required by the FDA. Preemption exists if the FDA had the authority to impose such obligations but did not do so. These are
covered by the “in addition to” clause of § 360k. The fact that
the FDA did not impose a requirement is irrelevant if the FDA
had the authority to impose that requirement.
Third, only state requirements that are “different from, or
in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to
the device” are preempted.182 Product liability claims that are
“parallel” to FDA requirements are not preempted.183
2. Understanding the Meaning of “Different from” and “in
Addition to”
Section 360k(a)(1) requires preemption (assuming all other
conditions for preemption have been met) in two situations.
181. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1), (3), (6) (2011).
182. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2006).
183. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. The definition of what is “parallel” and the
intersection between the “parallel claim” language in Riegel and the prohibition of private causes of action under Buckman is outside of the scope of this
article. We note that under 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) “a State or local requirement prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded devices”
is not preempted—presumably as long as it is a “parallel” claim under Riegel.
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First, there is preemption in situations in which the FDA has
affirmatively created device specific requirements that are “different from” the plaintiff’s claim or the jury’s decision. While
this situation can generally be analyzed as express preemption,
it also can be viewed as conflict preemption. If the FDA requires a two-inch wire and the plaintiff is asserting that the
wire should be one-inch,184 one can find either express preemption under § 360k (the “different from” prong of 21 U.S.C.
360k(a)(1)) or conflict preemption because the defendant literally could not comply with both requirements at the same time.
These “different from” or conflict cases are not common.
Most preemption cases since Lohr have involved situations
in which the plaintiff is asserting that the defendant should
have done something more than what the FDA required under
the PMA or cleared under the 510(k).185 This can include, for
example, assertions that additional warnings should have been
given, or some part of the device could have been designed in a
more robust fashion. These cases are not conflict preemption
cases because, for example, the plaintiff argues the defendant
could physically have added the warning without contradicting
any actual FDA mandated warning. Rather, these cases must
be analyzed under the “in addition to” prong of §360k(a)(1).
These “in addition to” cases involve situations in which the
FDA had the statutory authority to compel the defendant to do
whatever the plaintiff asserts should have been done, but the
FDA did not compel the additional warning or different design.
For example, in the PMA context, the courts recognize that the
FDA could have compelled additional warnings as part of the
PMA approval process.186 In this PMA context, the state requirement is “in addition to” whatever FDA actually required
and thus is preempted.
The key is that the “in addition to” prong of § 360k covers
all situations in which the FDA has the power to act but has
184. This is Justice Breyer’s famous example in his concurrence in part and
concurrence in the result in Lohr. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 504
(1996).
185. See, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, 105 F.3d 1090 (6th
Cir. 1997); Webster v. Pacesetter, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001).
186. Many products are modifications of PMA products and so go through a
supplemental PMA process. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2011). For our purposes,
there is no meaningful difference between an original PMA and a supplemental PMA. Courts have not found any difference for preemption purposes.
See, e.g., Blunt v. Medtronic, Inc., 760 N.W.2d 396, 405–08 (Wis. 2009).
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not done so for whatever reason. Section 360k clearly creates
minimum standards. If the FDA requires a warning on the label and the defendant fails to include that warning, the plaintiff may well have a relatively easy “parallel claim” case (assuming proximate causation and all of the other traditional
requirements of a product liability case). However, the FDA
does much more than simply create minimum standards. The
FDA also creates maximum standards. A product approval is a
balancing act. Different designs and different warnings create
different advantages and disadvantages. Adding a warning can,
for example, actually cause harm as patients and physicians
change prescribing habits. 187 A classic example of this occurred
when new teen suicide warnings were added to serotoninspecific reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs)—a type of antidepressant.
Actual product use decreased and the number of suicides increased.188
The FDA has been authorized by Congress to make these
balances. Permitting state product liability cases to impose additional requirements undermines this authority. Thus, the “in
addition to” prong of § 360k preempts a state court from imposing other design, labeling, or manufacturing requirements.
Preemption covers the ability to impose requirements, not just
the existence of a requirement.
3. If Modifications Require FDA Approval, Preemption Exists
A key question in a medical device product liability case is
whether a manufacturer is permitted to make some design
change or change in warnings for a 510(k) product without prior FDA concurrence.
In determining whether the FDA has the right to impose
both the minimum and maximum requirements, courts often
look at whether the change being proposed by the plaintiff
could be implemented without FDA approval. If FDA approval
is needed, then courts generally hold that there is preemption.
This approach is best demonstrated by Wyeth v. Levine.189 In
this drug product liability case, the Supreme Court was faced
with an implied preemption argument.190 The plaintiff argued
187. See generally Ralph F. Hall, The Risk of Risk Reduction: Can
Postmarket Surveillance Pose More Risk than Benefit?, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
473, 485–87 (2007) (describing the reduction of SSRI use and FDA’s response).
188. Id. at 486.
189. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1198 (2009).
190. There is no statutory equivalent to § 360k in the drug provisions of the
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that Wyeth should have added new or additional warnings to it
label for the drug in question. The defendant countered by arguing that its label was FDA approved. The Supreme Court
sided with the plaintiff and found that Wyeth could have unilaterally added the warning advocated by the plaintiff using
the “changes being effected” (CBE) process set forth in the drug
regulations.191
The Supreme Court continued to follow this approach
when it found preemption in a generic drug case because the
generic drug manufacturing was not covered by the CBE provisions applicable to the name brand. As a result, the generic
drug company could not make any change without prior FDA
approval, and the plaintiff’s failure to warn claim was preempted.192 In essence, a requirement is specific to a device (or drug)
if the manufacturer could not change or modify the product to
address that requirement without prior FDA approval.
This question is directly answered for 510(k) products by
existing FDA regulations and guidance, which establish that
changes to 510(k) products intended to address safety or effectiveness issues or which could substantially affect safety or effectiveness cannot be implemented without prior FDA review
and clearance. Chapter 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a) states:
[E]ach person . . . must submit a premarket notification submission to
the Food and Drug Administration at least 90 days before he proposes
to begin the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce for commercial distribution of a device intended for human
use which meets any of the following criteria:

...
(3) The device is one that the person currently has in commercial
distribution or is reintroducing into commercial distribution, but
that is about to be significantly changed or modified in design,
components, method of manufacture, or intended use. The following constitute significant changes or modifications that require a
premarket notification:
(i) A change or modification in the device that could significantly affect the safety or effectiveness of the device, e.g., a
significant change or modification in design, material, chemical composition, energy source, or manufacturing process.193

FDCA. Courts, including Levine have used implied preemption doctrine as the
basis for preemption arguments.
191. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6) (2008).
192. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2580–81 (2011).
193. 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
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As stated in the regulation and accompanying guidance, a
company must submit a new 510(k) whenever it wishes to
make a change to an already cleared device and that change
“could significantly affect the safety or effectiveness of the device.” 194 This places products under the 510(k) system in the
same category as cases such as Mensing in which the Supreme
Court found preemption in large part because the company
could not make a product change without prior FDA approval.
Likewise, this regulatory structure differentiates the 510(k)
system from the new drug world of Levine in which the company could make a change prior to FDA approval.195
The same general requirements apply to PMA devices.196 A
company cannot distribute a PMA product with a change that
could affect safety or effectiveness.197 This fact supported the
finding of preemption in Riegel. In that case the company
couldn’t make the change required by the plaintiff’s theory

194. Current guidance explaining and implementing these requirements
can be found at: OFFICE OF DEVICE EVALUATION, DECIDING WHEN TO SUBMIT
A 510(K) FOR A CHANGE TO AN EXISTING DEVICE 1 (1997), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm080243.pdf. Note that the FDA has recently issued a
draft update to this guidance. See, e.g., OFFICE OF DEVICE EVALUATION,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF—510(K) DEVICE MODIFICATIONS:
DECIDING WHEN TO SUBMIT A 510(K) FOR A CHANGE TO AN EXISTING DEVICE
(2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceReg
ulationandGuidance/ GuidanceDocuments/UCM265349.pdf. This guidance is
still in draft form. The differences between the 1997 guidance and the new
draft guidance are not relevant to the question of whether the FDA has the
authority to require a new 510(k) if a company is making a change that could
significantly affect safety.
195. If a company does make a change to a 510(k) device and markets that
product prior to FDA approval, the agency can always exercise its enforcement
discretion and not bring an administrative, civil, or criminal action. It may
well be that the FDA might, in certain circumstances decide not to bring an
enforcement action. That enforcement discretion decision does not, however,
magically make an illegal act legal.
196. The 510(k) system requires a submission if a change could significantly affect safety. The PMA system requires a new submission for a change that
could affect safety. While this linguistic difference is important to regulatory
professionals, it is hard to imagine a product liability lawsuit in which the
plaintiff argues that the defendant should have made a change, but that the
change could not significantly affect safety. The causation basis of the plaintiff’s case is that his or her injuries were, in fact, caused by the failure to make
the change advocated by the plaintiff.
197. 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2008). Note that, unlike the 510(k) system, the
PMA system can, in unusual circumstances, permit certain limited types of
changes to be made while the FDA is reviewing the supplemental PMA. See
id.
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without prior FDA approval.198 The parallel modification requirements for PMA and 510(k) devices further reinforces the
conclusion that modern 510(k) products are under the Riegel
rule, not the Lohr approach.
The post Lohr regulatory system is consistent with wellestablished Supreme Court preemption law. The manufacturer
of a 510(k) product cannot make a change which could significantly affect safety without prior FDA clearance of a new
510(k) submission covering that change. Thus, preemption under § 360k should apply.
B. PREEMPTION UNDER § 360K—AND WHY LOHR DOES NOT
APPLY TO CURRENT 510(K) PRODUCTS
In Lohr, the Court conducted a statutory analysis of the
510(k) system as it existed in 1982 and concluded that the
FDCA did not preempt the plaintiff’s product liability claims.199
However, the precedential impact of Lohr for 510(k) products
cleared under the current system is highly questionable. This
view is not based on an argument that Lohr itself was incorrectly decided. Rather, the medical device statutes have
changed dramatically in the thirty years since 1982, and the
courts cannot and should not ignore these changes. As such, the
Supreme Court’s analysis of the 1982 510(k) system for
preemption purposes is not outcome determinative for whether
there is preemption under the 2012 510(k) system.
In analyzing 510(k) preemption, it is important not to be
misled by the date of the decision in Lohr. The Supreme Court’s
decision was handed down in 1996. That is not the relevant
date. The Court (quite correctly) analyzed the statutory system
as it existed at the time the product in question was cleared by
the FDA—that was in 1982. To understand the holding and
limitations of Lohr one must look at the 510(k) system as it existed at that time.200

198. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312–13 (2008).
199. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 503 (1996).
200. Interestingly—and in full support of this view—the Court in Lohr did
not analyze the SMDA and its role in preemption. The Court only mentions
the SMDA in two places: in footnote 3 of the case, which pointed out how the
SMDA and subsequent FDA actions could change the regulatory classification
of pacemakers, and in footnote 4, which also pointed out how the SMDA had
changed the device regulatory system. Surely the Supreme Court would have
reviewed the regulatory system post-SMDA if that had been relevant to the
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A similar statutory interpretation of today’s FDCA, in conjunction with the FDA’s own view of the 510(k) system and actual 510(k) clearance records, reveals that the 510(k) process
does assess safety and effectiveness and that there are specific
requirements for products. Therefore, the 510(k) system should
preempt product liability claims against devices cleared under
the current 510(k) system.201
C. IMPACT OF THE SAFE MEDICAL DEVICE ACT OF 1990
Medical technology and the clinical application of medical
devices experienced a rapid expansion between the Medical
Device Amendments in 1976 and the Safe Medical Devices Act
of 1990 (SMDA). The introduction of new technologies and medical devices required Congress and the FDA to modify the then
existing regulatory system. In fact, the explicit purpose of the
SMDA was to substantially enhance the oversight of medical
devices including making major changes to the 510(k) process.
Consistent with the Court’s analysis in Lohr, a statutory
interpretation of §§ 360k and 513(i)202 should start with a fair
understanding of congressional purpose of the current regulatory scheme. The lead at issue in Lohr predated the SMDA. If a
similar situation arose today, the Court would analyze “substantial equivalence” as defined in the SMDA and subsequent
congressional and regulatory enactments.
In this instance, the purpose of Congress in enacting the
SMDA is clear—the Act was to further a policy promoting the
safety and effectiveness of medical devices by providing a more
stringent or robust regulatory frame to effectuate that purpose.203 After the SMDA, the FDA had substantially more rocase. The Court, quite correctly, looked only at the 1982 510(k) system. Lohr,
thus, does not address the 510(k) system for products cleared after 1990.
201. As we discuss at length, at the relevant time for the Lohr analysis, the
510(k) clearance process was different from the current process. We do not argue that Lohr was incorrectly decided, but rather, in light of the 510(k) clearance process conducted today, Lohr does not control preemption cases involving products cleared today and a new standard should be applied in 510(k)
product liability suits.
202. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act § 513(i), 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3) (2006). Section 513(i) now contains the provisions referring to substantial equivalence.
203. In 1997, the passage of the FDAMA furthered Congress’s purpose of
increasing safety and effectiveness of market distributed products. See Linda
A. Suydam & Milan J. Kubic, FDA’s Implementation of FDAMA: An Interim
Balance Sheet, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 131, 131 (2001) (noting the “exceptional
addition” FDAMA provided the FDA with statutory authority in addition to
“reaffirming the agency’s vital importance for the protection of public health”).
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bust authority to ensure the safety and effectiveness of medical
devices in furtherance of congressional policy.
The 1982 510(k) system (based on the 1976 MDA) relied
upon performance standards and a physical comparison of
products as the means to provide the necessary reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. Instead of relying on performance standards (an approach that turned out to be unwieldy), the SMDA instead utilized the concept of “special
controls.”204 Special controls can include, among other requirements, clinical data, bench testing, satisfaction of consensus
standards, use of specific materials, and post-market surveillance.205
The SMDA also added, for the first time, a statutory definition of substantial equivalence.206 The Supreme Court in Lohr
did not face or decide the question of whether the new statutory
definition of substantial equivalence, together with the added
control mechanism provided by special controls, demonstrates
that the post-1990 510(k) system does address safety and effectiveness. The bottom line is that if the Medtronic lead at issue
in Lohr was cleared through the 510(k) process of today’s statutory framework—the more robust process created by the
SMDA—there would be a much greater assessment of the safety and effectiveness of the lead. Under the current FDCA, the
FDA has the statutory authority to impose special controls, require data submission, and make a clear determination of the
safety and effectiveness of the lead prior to its clearance and
market release.
D. 510(K) ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS:
OPINIONS OF THE FDA
In Lohr, the Court concluded that the 1982 version of “the
510(k) process was [not] intended to do anything other than
maintain the status quo, which included the possibility that a
device’s manufacturer would have to defend itself against statelaw negligent design claims.”207 At the time of Lohr, the FDA
may have even agreed that there was no assessment for safety
and effectiveness of a 510(k) device’s design. In contrast, the

204.
205.
206.
207.

21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2006).
See 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2) (2011).
21 U.S.C. § 360c(i).
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 471 (1996).
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FDA today asserts that after several “statutory and regulatory
modifications over time, [the 510(k) system] has become a multifaceted premarket review process that . . . provide[s] reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness [and] facilitate[s] innovation in the medical device industry.”208 The 510(k) process
is now the principal route used for medical devices to reach
market.209
The FDA’s assessment of the program it runs is critical.
The FDA is neutral and has the greatest expertise. The agency’s mission is to protect public health and provide a reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness. An effective 510(k) system is obviously critical to that goal.
1. The FDA Asserts That It Is Making Safety and Effectiveness
Determinations for 510(k) Devices
The FDA has very recently reaffirmed that today’s 510(k)
system does assess safety and effectiveness. In December 2011,
the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) issued
a draft guidance regarding how it assesses “substantial equivalence” under the 510(k) process.210 This draft guidance explicitly states that the 510(k) program does assess safety and effectiveness:
Because devices are classified according to the level of regulatory control necessary to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness, classification of a new device through the 510(k) process requires FDA to determine the issues of safety and effectiveness
presented by the new device, and the regulatory controls necessary to
address those issues.211

The FDA continues and states that “the principles of safety
208. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, 510(K) WORKING GROUP
PRELIMINARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, CDRH PRELIMINARY
INTERNAL
EVALUATIONS
34
(Aug.
2010),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports
/UCM220784.pdf.
209. Heather S. Rosecrans, Dir., 510(k) Staff, When to Submit (or Not) a
510K, That Is the Question!. Presentation at the AMDA/FDA-OVID Workshop
(Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.amdm.org/presentations.html (follow “OVID Submissions Workshop” hyperlink, download and open the .zip file, then open the
“Rosecrans.pdf”).
210. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 1, 5−8. Note that guidance documents, including this Draft Guidance, do not and cannot create new policy. Id.
at 1; see also 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2011). Rather, guidance documents further
explain or describe existing policy and requirements. As such, the Draft Guidance does not reflect any substantive changes in how the 510(k) system assesses safety and effectiveness. Id.
211. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
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and effectiveness underlie the substantial equivalence determination in every 510(k) review.”212
What has confused some about the 510(k) system, in addition to the fundamental changes made to the system over thirty-five years, is that the 510(k) system uses a different means
to assess safety and effectiveness than does the PMA system.
Each PMA is a separate review and does not require comparison to another device. The 510(k) system instead compares the
device under review to another, already cleared device, for
which a “reasonable assurance of[] safety and effectiveness” has
already been demonstrated and uses special controls to impose
safety and effectiveness requirements on product types.213 The
2011 Draft Guidance explains this as follows:
Although the 510(k) process involves a comparison of a new device to
a predicate device rather than an independent demonstration of the
new device’s safety and effectiveness, as is required for approval of a
PMA, in both cases FDA’s review decision reflects a determination of
the level of control necessary to provide a “reasonable assurance of
safety and effectiveness.” The evidentiary standard, however, is different. In the 510(k) context, FDA generally relies, in part, on FDA’s prior determination that a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness exists for the predicate device.214

What could be clearer? The FDA specifically states that the
current 510(k) system makes a safety and effectiveness determination.
Section 360k does not limit or specify the way in which the
FDA assesses device safety and effectiveness. Rather, it simply
requires that the FDA do so in order for there to be preemption.
Earlier guidance also confirms that, at least post-SMDA, the
FDA does make a safety and effectiveness determination as
part of the clearance process. A key guidance describing the
510(k) system states: “Section 513(i) of the Act states that the
FDA may issue an order of substantial equivalence only upon
making a determination that the device to be introduced into
commercial distribution is as safe and effective as a legally
marketed device.”215

212. Id. at 6.
213. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2011).
214. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 7 (emphasis added) (footnote admitted).
215. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, THE NEW 510(K)
PARADIGM—ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL
EQUIVALENCE IN PREMARKET NOTIFICATIONS —FINAL GUIDANCE 1 (1998),
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Further evidence from the FDA’s own documents also
demonstrates that the FDA is making a safety and effectiveness finding for 510(k) devices. First, in September of 2007, the
CDRH, the department in charge of overseeing medical device
regulation, released to the public a guidance document providing direction to reviewers and industry alike on the use of national consensus standards in medical device evaluation. In
this guidance document, CDRH explicitly states that it “believes that conformance with recognized consensus standards
[a means of showing substantial equivalence under the 510(k)
system] can support a reasonable assurance of safety and/or effectiveness for many applicable aspects of medical devices.”216
Again, in December 2011, the CDRH published a draft
guidance document detailing the current “statutory framework”
of the 510(k) clearance process.217 Issued as recommendations
for the future of 510(k), this guidance document makes clear
that the FDA is not only currently conducting a safety and effectiveness determination for 510(k) devices, but that safety
and effectiveness are at the crux of 510(k) clearance decisions.
For instance, when describing the 510(k) review standard, the
CDRH states that “[s]afety and effectiveness factor into both
parts of [the 510(k)] review standard.”218 The guidance document goes on to conclude that “in both cases [PMA and 510(k)
review] FDA’s review decision reflects a determination of the
level of control necessary to provide a ‘reasonable assurance of
safety and effectiveness.’”219
In addition to specific statements found in guidance documents, the requirements for the content of a 510(k) submission
establish that a safety and effectiveness determination is taking place. The CDRH’s regulations detail what the sponsor of a

available at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance
/GuidanceDocuments/ucm080187.htm.
216. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF—RECOGNITION AND USE OF CONSENSUS
STANDARDS 5 (2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm077295.pdf [hereinafter CONSENSUS STANDARDS].
217. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 3; see CONSENSUS STANDARDS,
supra note 216, at 4−5 (reinforcing that the 510(k) provision is in place to
promote the FDA’s public health mission by ensuring devices are safe and effective when marketed. The CDRH also recognizes that past implementations
of the 510(k) may have failed to adequately achieve this goal).
218. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 7.
219. Id.
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510(k) must submit in order to obtain clearance. Among other
requirements, the sponsor is required to submit to CDRH a
summary of safety and effectiveness or a 510(k) statement.220
Chapter 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a) states that for a finding of substantial equivalence, “[a] 510(k) summary shall be [submitted]
in sufficient detail to provide an understanding of the basis for
a determination of substantial equivalence.”221 More specifically, Congress requires that a 510(k) submission “shall provide
an adequate summary of any information respecting safety and
effectiveness or state that such information will be made available upon request by any person.”222 This 510(k) statement or
summary of safety and effectiveness is also made available to
the public within thirty days of a substantial equivalence decision for the 510(k). 223 Furthermore, the FDA requires the
510(k) submitter—if they choose to submit a 510(k) summary
in lieu of a 510(k) statement to submit “[t]he conclusions drawn
from the nonclinical and clinical tests that demonstrate that
the device is as safe, as effective, and performs as well as or
better than the legally marketed device identified[as a predicate device].”224 The requisite scientific evidence includes performance data—both clinical and nonclinical tests—that were
used by the manufacturer.225 Remember that this type of information historically was only required for PMA devices and
was not required for Medtronic’s 4011 lead to prove substantial
equivalence. Today, the FDA may also request additional information prior to clearing the device for market if the information has relevance to the FDA’s review; namely, the FDA reviews “all available safety and effectiveness information”
available for the medical device.226
Thus the requisite basis and additional scientific information submitted with every 510(k) submission substantiates
the FDA’s safety and effectiveness determination because the
basis of clearance requires evidence demonstrating that the de-

220. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92 (2011).
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3)(A) (2006).
223. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3)(B).
224. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(b)(3).
225. See id. (requiring only data that show substantial equivalence). This
contrasts the PMA process where such clinical studies are required to show
safety and effectiveness.
226. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, supra note 208, at 73.
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vice operates similarly to its predicate, and that the device is
safe and effective for its intended purpose. The FDA’s implementing regulations reinforce these requirements.
The Office of Device Evaluation and the Office of In Vitro
Diagnostics also explicitly states new devices are “not substantially equivalent” if they do not demonstrate they are at least
as safe and effective, if not more so, as their predicate.227 It logically follows that to determine whether a device is “at least as
safe and effective” as the predicate device, one must determine
how safe and effective the new device is. When is the FDA determines that a 510(k) device is “at least as safe and effective”
as its predicate, that determination is a conclusion that the device is sufficiently safe and effective for clearance.228 Stated differently, a clearance is granted when the FDA believes the
510(k) sponsor has provided information to provide reasonable
assurance of the device’s safety and effectiveness in order to
demonstrate substantial equivalence. Consistent with this conclusion, § 360k should apply to 510(k) product liability claims;
both PMA and 510(k) cases should be analyzed using the
standard in Riegel.
When taken together, the current 510(k) system is unlike
that in place at the time of Lohr. In Lohr, no evidence of safety
and effectiveness was required for the Model 4011 Lead. Medical devices manufacturers now must produce such evidence
demonstrating a finding of safety and effectiveness that is then
reviewed by the FDA.229 The FDA has the authority to impose
new special controls over 510(k) products to provide reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness even if there are identical
predicates. The FDA has demonstrated that it is making this
determination of safety and effectiveness and has the authority
to impose safety requirements, thereby preempting any sort of
alternative, state-based claim.

227. Rosecrans, supra note 209, at 41.
228. The actual statutory standard for permitting a medical device is that
“there is reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness” of the device. 21
U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(C) (2006). This standard applies to all medical device classes. The statute does not require absolute safety. Rather, products are reviewed on a risk/benefit basis. If the benefits outweigh the risks, the product
should be approved or cleared. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2) (2006).
229. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92 (detailing all that is required for a device manufacturer to submit in their 510(k) summary).
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2. FDA’s Assessment of the 510(k) System Deserves Deference
The statutory provisions creating the 510(k) system may,
at first blush, appear confusing and obtuse. Because the current 510(k) system is the result of numerous statutory changes
over thirty-five years, it can be difficult to easily understand. In
fact, the actual words of § 510(k) seem to have little to do with
the system that is actually in place.230 However, as shown
above, when analyzed in detail, the 510(k) system clearly addresses device safety and effectiveness.
However, if one concludes that the statutory language is
not completely clear or is otherwise ambiguous in some way,
the FDA’s interpretation of the statute must be given substantial deference. The agency is the expert and is charged by Congress with implementing the statutory provisions and mission.
Unless unreasonable, long settled Supreme Court precedent
mandates that the FDA’s statements regarding the legal schema established through the 510(k) system, which makes safety
and effectiveness determinations, must be accepted.231 This is
particularly true given the consistency of the Agency’s implementation of the 510(k) system and the alignment of the agency’s interpretation and implementation with its congressionally
mandated mission.
The FDA’s interpretation that the post-1990 510(k) system
does assess safety and effectiveness is bolstered by Congressional action (and inaction) since 1990. Lohr was decided in
1996. If the agency or Congress believed that the post-1990
510(k) system ignored device safety, it would be amazing if they
did not change the system. Is it logical that Congress and the
FDA would permit literally tens of thousands of medical devices requiring 510(k) review to be marketed without a safety and
effectiveness assessment? It seems highly unlikely. And remember that Congress has made various changes to the medical device statutes since Lohr. In fact, the year after Lohr was
decided, Congress made a number of highly substantive chang230. One can debate whether we should call this the 513(i) system rather
than the 510(k) system. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. However,
for historical reasons, everyone, including Congress, refers to this as the
510(k) system.
231. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting forth the standard for when to grant deference to
a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute the agency is responsible for administering).
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es to the medical device provisions when it enacted the FDA
Modernization Act (FDAMA).232 This would have been the perfect time to add safety and effectiveness requirements to the
510(k) system if such provisions were lacking.
Unless one believes that Congress either did not notice the
Lohr decision or did not want medium risk devices assessed for
safety and effectiveness, the only logical explanation as to why
Congress or the FDA didn’t change—or even try to change—the
core 510(k)/substantial equivalence/special controls approach to
510(k) device regulation is that Congress already addressed
those issues with the 1990 SMDA.
Congressional action and the deference given to an agency’s interpretation of its enabling statutes provide strong support for a conclusion that the 510(k) system does assess safety
and effectiveness and that Lohr is not blindly applicable to
products cleared under today’s 510(k) system.
E. CERTAIN (BUT CERTAINLY NOT ALL) THIRD PARTIES ALSO
BELIEVE 510(K) CLEARANCES UNDERGO A SAFETY AND
EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT.
A number of third parties have opined, in one form or another, on whether the 510(k) system as currently enacted by
Congress gives the FDA the authority to consider safety and effectiveness in making 510(k) decisions. Many of these third
parties have referenced the role of the FDA as providing reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of 510(k)
cleared products. A number of others have made very different
and contrary statements.233
In assessing these statements or positions, it is imperative
to separate views on the authority Congress has given to the
FDA from issues or disagreements with the FDA’s use of that
authority in the implementation of the 510(k) program. Authority issues are the key preemption question—if the Agency does
not have the authority to regulate safety and effectiveness of a
medical device, then there is no preemption given the language
and requirements of § 360(k).234 If the FDA has the authority to
232. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
233. One must consider factors such as the potential biases of these third
parties, their expertise, and the robustness of the review they performed before deciding what weight to give to any such positions.
234. Lohr itself is the classic example of this difference between authority
and implementation questions. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). In
Lohr, the Court found that the FDA did not have the statutory authority to
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require whatever the plaintiff believes should have been done,
but simply did not do so for whatever reason, there is preemption. Implementation problems or disagreements are not relevant to preemption.235 One might believe that the FDA made a
mistake, missed some problem, or should have added a warning
to a product. However, the FDA preemption is explicitly designed to ensure that the agency—not a state court jury—
makes those decisions. Many criticisms from all sides address
implementation issues, not authority issues, and therefore are
not relevant to preemption issues.
While this article is not intended to present a detailed review of the secondary literature surrounding the actual implementation of the 510(k) system, several examples on both sides
of the question may be of interest.
1. Institute of Medicine Is Critical of the 510(k) System
One of the most publicized criticisms of the 510(k) system
came from an Institute of Medicine (IOM)236 report issued in
July 2011.237 The IOM was commissioned by the FDA to conduct an analysis of the 510(k) regulatory scheme.238 In addition
make safety and effectiveness decisions. Id. at 493−94. The Court’s decision in
this preemption case was based on the lack of authority to create safety and
effectiveness requirements, not whether the agency has wisely used that authority or made correct decisions. Id. at 502. In Riegel, the Court found that
the FDA did have such authority so preemption was appropriate under § 360k
whether or not the court agreed with the FDA’s decision. Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
235. Implementation problems are to be addressed by Congress, the agency, or the political process, not by state courts. See David M. Gossett, Chevron,
Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 681 (1997).
236. The IOM is part of the National Academies of Science and is intended
to provide “authoritative advice to decision makers.” About the IOM, INST.
MED. NAT’L ACADS., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last updated Jan.
18, 2012). The FDA asked the IOM to review the 510(k) clearance process for
medical devices. See October Report, supra note 15, at 12.
237. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MEDICAL DEVICES AND PUBLIC’S
HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS (2011) [hereinafREPORT],
available
at
ter
IOM
FINAL
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Medical-Devices-and-the-Publics-HealthThe-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-at-35-Years.aspx.
238. One of the authors of this paper has written several articles asserting
that the government is statutorily prohibited from relying on any report from
the IOM 510(k) committee (regardless of its conclusions) because the IOM
committee failed to have fair balance and representation from all stakeholders
as required by § 15 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Ralph Hall & Eva
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to its final report in July 2011, the IOM released several
“Workshop Reports” detailing the FDA’s 510(k) clearance process during the course of their study.239 The output of the IOM
committee presents two, somewhat conflicting, pictures of the
510(k) system.
In the IOM’s October 2010 Report, the IOM stated that a
safety and effectiveness determination is conducted prior to
clearance of 510(k) medical devices. The IOM pointedly and
correctly asserted that the same definitions of safe and efficacious apply to every medical device; the difference lies in how
safety and effectiveness are determined for the specific device.240 The October Report sets forth how the FDA’s governing
statutes establish safety and effectiveness, largely through the
submission of data, special controls, and product classification
systems.241 Conversely, in its final report, the IOM stated that
“[t]he 510(k) clearance process is not intended to evaluate the
safety and effectiveness of medical devices with some exceptions.”242 IOM supports this conclusion, in part, by relying on
Lohr—but without making the reassessment of that case as is
done in this article.243
More interestingly—and not apparent from the IOM headline—the IOM’s major criticism is not that the 510(k) system
does not make a safety and effectiveness determination when
reviewing a product, but rather the IOM is critical of the basis
for the safety and effectiveness determination. Right after its
conclusory statement referenced above, the IOM says “when
the FDA finds a device substantially equivalent to a predicate
device . . . it has done no more than find that the new device is
Svensvad, A Failure to Comply: An Initial Assessment of Gaps in IOM’s Medical Device Study Committee, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 731 (2011); Ralph
Hall & Eva Svensvad, Left to Their Own Devices: IOM’s Medical Device Committee’s Failure to Comply, 13 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 91 (2012); see also Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15 (2006).
239. See, e.g., October Report, supra note 15, at 2.
240. Id. at 8 (defining safety as the benefits of the medical device outweighing the risks and defining effectiveness as device producing significant results
in a considerable portion of the intended population).
241. Id. at 11.
242. IOM FINAL REPORT, supra note 237, at 5. Even if one accepts the IOM
conclusion without any analysis, that conclusion requires that preemption in
510(k) cases exists in at least some cases. The IOM states that there are some
cases in which the 510(k) system does conduct a safety and effectiveness determination.
243. The IOM repeats this conclusion at various places throughout the report using essentially the same reasoning and analysis. See, e.g., id. at 193.
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as safe and effective as the predicate.”244 So as even the IOM
agrees, the FDA makes a safety and effectiveness determination—it is just that the IOM disagrees with the criteria for that
assessment.245
Even taking the IOM’s statement as true (something which
many contest), the IOM is simply disagreeing with the criteria
or method used by the FDA to make a safety and effectiveness
determination. The fact that, as even the IOM concedes, the
FDA makes a safety and effectiveness determination and has
the express authority to impose special controls or data requirements is why § 360k is applicable to 510(k) products
cleared under the current regulatory system.
The IOM also acknowledges that the medical device system
uses data to determine the proper classification of the device—
Class I, II, or III—that will ensure its safety and effectiveness.246 The decision to place a device in a particular regulatory
class is a finding that the device’s safety and effectiveness will
be properly maintained under the regulatory controls the class
imposes. Thus, the FDA has made a safety and effectiveness
determination that the 510(k) system provides an adequate assurance of safety and effectiveness for that product if the device
is determined to be substantially equivalent. This determination is made prior to the first market distribution of a product
of that type. This process demonstrates the FDA’s focus on the
safety and effectiveness of 510(k) devices.247
The IOM may or may not be correct in its conclusion that
the 510(k) system is insufficient and should be “junked,” and
we note that the FDA immediately rejected the IOM’s call to
244. Id. at 5–6.
245. As an aside, generic drugs generally are required to show that they
are as safe and effective as the reference drug. This is the same philosophical
approach to regulation of new products as that which the IOM criticized in its
view of how the 510(k) uses predicates. As noted elsewhere, generic drug lawsuits are subject to preemption as set forth in cases such as Mensing. See Section II.E. supra.
246. IOM FINAL REPORT, supra note 237, at 12–13. The accompanying scientific data demonstrates the safety and effectiveness of the device, allowing
the FDA to appropriately place the device under the regulatory controls that
will further the safety and effectiveness of the device.
247. October Report, supra note 15, at 11–12 (finding, in addition, that any
change in the device that may affect its safety and effectiveness requires the
manufacturer to submit additional data and “obtain a new clearance from the
FDA”). This allows the FDA to verify that 510K devices on the market remain
safe and effective for public use.
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“junk” the 510(k) system.248 That argument is for the agency
and Congress. The fact that, as even the IOM agrees, the
510(k) process determines that the device in question is “as safe
as” the predicate, that the device in question raises no new
questions of safety and effectiveness, and that the 510(k) system provides a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness
is a safety determination outside of the authority of a state
court jury to overthrow.
2. Industry Views
While industry’s views on the 510(k) system must be assessed with consideration of the source, industry knows the
510(k) system inside and out. Industry universally supports the
conclusion that the 510(k) system is intended by Congress and
the FDA to provide a “reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.”249
Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed) is a
prominent player in the medical device industry and is deeply
involved in the 510(k) regulatory process.250 AdvaMed concludes, “data on device safety and use” is always collected in
510(k) submissions.251 Ultimately, AdvaMed believes that the
510(k) process is “one of many regulatory controls FDA has in
place to ensure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices,
regardless of their path to market.”252
The California Healthcare Institute (CHI)253 also affirms
248. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA to Seek Public Comment on
IOM
Recommendations
(July
29,
2011),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm265908.
htm.
249. October Report, supra note 15, at 9.
250. What We Do, ADVAMED, http://www.advamed.org/MemberPortal/ (last
visited Apr. 12, 2012). AdvaMed is a trade association for medical device companies. Id.
251. ADVAMED, THE 510(K) PROCESS: THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE DEVICE
REGULATION
19
(2008),
available
at
http://www.onlinetmd.com/FileUploads/file/AdvaMed_510K_White_Paper.pdf
(emphasis added) (clarifying that “[t]his [data] provides FDA with information
on actual, clinical use of well-characterized medical devices on which to base
regulatory decisions”—the regulatory decisions that will continue to assure
the determined safety and effectiveness of the device as demonstrated by the
collected data).
252. Id. at 22 (emphasis added) (noting that “[i]t is important for patients
to know that devices cleared via the 510(k) process undergo thorough FDA review” allowing the FDA to make sure devices are safe and effective).
253. California Heath Institute is “[a] public policy research and advocacy
organization for California’s biomedical industry.” California Healthcare Insti-
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the FDA’s assurance of safe and effective devices through the
510(k) clearance process. In reaching this conclusion, the CHI
relies heavily on the FDA’s increased requirements and emphasis on assuring safety to support the CHI’s belief that
510(k) medical devices that are determined to be substantially
equivalent are found safe and effective prior to market distribution.254 As support, the CHI also cites empirical data demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of cleared devices. In particular, the CHI notes that 510(k) devices, are subject to Class I
recalls—recalls that present the most risk—at the same rate as
PMA devices.255 AdvaMed and the CHI support the FDA’s conclusion that the 510(k) process is clearing devices that the FDA
has found to be safe and effective to market.
3. Other Critics and Voices
Without doubt, the 510(k) system has been subject to
criticism from certain advocacy and medical groups. For example, Public Citizen has been critical of the 510(k) system for not
providing enough safety protection. In fact, Public Citizen supported the IOM’s call for a new system to replace the 510(k)
system.256 The concerns raised by Public Citizen focus on the
use of the “substantial equivalence” test for safety and effectiveness, the perceived lack of human clinical studies prior to
clearance of a number of 510(k)s, and the view that the system
was not appropriately balancing safety with patient access to
tute:
Organizational
Profile,
CHI,
http://www.chi.org/industry/
IndustryDetails.aspx?ID=5273 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
254. See CAL. HEALTHCARE INST., UPCOMING CHANGES TO THE 510K
PROCESS: NEW APPROVAL PATHWAYS AND THE IMPACT ON MEDICAL DEVICE
AND
DEVELOPMENT
AND
INNOVATION
(2010),
available
at
http://www.chi.org/uploadedFiles/Industry_at_a_glance/CHI-510K-WhitePaper-FINAL.pdf.
255. Id. at 6.
256. See, e.g., Article in PLos Medicine on Breakdown of U.S. Device Review
Process, PUB. CITIZEN (July 2012), http://www.citizen.org/hrg1912; Statement
of Dr. Michael Carome, Deputy Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Research Group,
Public Citizen Applauds IOM’s Findings and Recommendations on 510(K)
Medical Device Clearance Process (July 29, 2011), available at
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3393. It must be
noted that a long time Public Citizen litigation attorney and head of that
group for a number of years was a contributor to this article and also served
on the IOM 510(k) committee. It appears that he continues to serve in an of
counsel role with Public Citizen. See Michael Carome, M.D. Deputy Director,
CITIZEN,
http://www.citizen.org/
Health
Research
Group,
PUB.
Page.aspx?pid=5140 (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
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new or improved products.
Several medical journals and medical societies have also
published articles or otherwise opined on the robustness of the
510(k) system. Some of these are critical and make the same
points expressed by Public Citizen. Some assert that the 510(k)
system is allowing an excessive number of unsafe products onto
the market. In addition to challenging the basic premises underlying the 510(k) system, these articles also question the
FDA’s implementation of the statutory authority provided by
Congress.
The medical community has differing view on this issue.
Others in the medical community have expressed support for
the 510(k) system based on the view that the 510(k) system
provides the agency with the authority to balance safety concerns with patient access to valuable new medical therapies.257
Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with these various positions, many of their stated concerns relate to implementation differences not authority issues.
F. RECENT 510(K) CLEARANCES DEMONSTRATE AN ASSESSMENT
OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS
One of the best tests for whether the 510(k) system in fact
assesses safety and effectiveness is to look at how the system is
actually implemented. To do so, one can review recent 510(k)
clearances of actual medical devices. When one does so, one
clearly sees that in actual 510(k) clearances the FDA repeatedly references its review of safety and effectiveness data and
that cleared products meet the statutory requirement for a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.
When a device manufacturer submits a 510(k) summary—
instead of making the 510(k) statement—for the 510(k) for
their device, the summary must include a basis for the FDA to
conclude substantial equivalence.258 As discussed in section III,
D.1, the manufacturer must include a “brief discussion of the
clinical tests submitted . . . [that] include[s] . . . a discussion of
the safety and effectiveness data[.]”259 Recent devices deter257. See, for example, the position of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons questioning whether there is actually a systemic problem with
the 510(k) system. William M. Mihalko et al., The 510(k) Process—It’s Not
Broken, so Why “Fix” it?, AM. ACAD. ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS (Oct. 2010),
http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/oct10/cover2.asp.
258. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92 (2011).
259. Id. Further, for a device to gain clearance, the tests must demonstrate
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mined substantially equivalent under 510(k), coupled with
their 510(k) summary demonstrate that FDA does, in fact,
make safety and effectiveness assessments in making 510(k)
product clearance decisions.
Via Biomedical, Inc.’s Stent Graft Balloon Catheter was
determined substantially equivalent and cleared for market
distribution in 2009.260 Included in the 510(k) summary was
the following:
The Stent Graft Balloon Catheter underwent mechanical, performance, and biocompatibility testing to verify that the device functions
in a safe and effective manner. The results of the tests provide reasonable assurance that the device has been designed and tested to assure
conformance to the requirements for its indications for use.261

In accepting Via Biomedical’s 510(k) summary and clearing
the catheter for market, FDA acknowledged and confirmed the
devices substantial equivalence for the indications determined
safe and effective in the proceeding summary.262
Becton, Dickinson and Company’s (Becton) BD Flu+ Syringe was cleared for marketing on July 2, 2009. As part of the
requisite basis the manufacturer must submit, Becton expressly indicated that “[d]esign [v]erification tests were performed
based on the risk analysis performed, and the results of these
tests demonstrate that the BD Flu + Syringe performed in an
equivalent manner to the predicate device and is safe and effective when used as intended.”263 The FDA similarly cleared the
BD Flu + Syringe for its intended use—the specific use for
which Becton determined. In doing so, the FDA confirmed the
finding of safety and effectiveness for the BD Flu + Syringe.
Likewise, ArthoCare’s Bone Cement Opacifier was cleared
under 510(k) after the FDA confirmed that “[t]he performance
testing and device comparison demonstrated that the subject
device [was] substantially equivalent to the predicate device,

that “the device is as safe, as effective, and performs as well as or better than
the [predicate] device . . . .” Id.
260. 510K Summary from Via Biomedical, Inc. on the Stent Graft Balloon
Catheter, ACCESSDATA (May 29, 2009), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
cdrh_docs/pdf9/K091624.pdf.
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. See id.
263. 510K Summary of Safety and Effectiveness from Becton, Dickinson
and Company on the BD Flu+ Syringe, ACCESSDATA (July 2, 2009),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf9/K091377.pdf.
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and is safe and effective for its intended use.”264
Other examples of 510(k) devices—Master Healthcare’s
Easy Touch Insulin Syringe,265 ZOLL Circulation’s Central Venous Catheter and Thermal Regulating System266 and Medtronic’s Cardiopulmonary Centrifugal Blood Pump267—all included performance data specifically relating to and
determining the safety and effectiveness of the device as part of
the “basis” for 510(k) clearance.
Actual 510(k) clearances repeatedly reference safety and
effectiveness determinations. The real life implementation of
the 510(k) system confirms that Congress created and the FDA
implemented a system that specifically includes safety and effectiveness determinations.
G. WHAT DOES A SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DETERMINATION
MEAN FOR LOHR?
The Supreme Court found that the product liability claims
in Lohr were not preempted based on the Court’s conclusion
that under the 1982 510(k) system the FDA never made and
did not have the authority to make a safety and effectiveness
determination for the Model 4011 lead. The Court also found
that the 1982 501(k) system did not create any device specific
safety and effectiveness requirements applicable to the Model
4011 lead. The Court left open the question of preemption for
PMA devices—a question the Court answered in the affirmative a few years later in Riegel. The Court found preemption in
Riegel because the FDA does make a safety and effectiveness
finding for PMA products.
When applying current preemption doctrine to the 510(k)
system, one can see that all of the relevant substantive ele-

264. 510K Summary from ArthroCare on the Bone Cement Opacifier,
ACCESSDATA (Dec. 27, 2004), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/
pdf4/K042947.pdf (emphasis added). The device was not found to be as safe as
the predicate, but there was an independent assessment. Id. The device was
both substantially equivalent to the predicate as well safe and effective. Id.
265. 510K Summary from Masters Healthcare on the Easy Touch Insulin
Syringe, ACCESSDATA (May 14, 2009) http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
cdrh_docs/pdf9/K091474.pdf.
266. 510K Summary from ZOLL Circulation for Venous Catheter and
Thermal
Regulating
System,
ACCESSDATA
(Oct.
12,
2010),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf10/K101987.pdf.
267. Summary of Safety and Effectiveness from Medtronic for the Cardiopulmonary Centrifugal Blood Pump, ACCESS DATA (June 21, 2010),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf10/K100631.pdf.
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ments of the PMA system found in Riegel to require preemption
now exist in the 510(k) system. Specifically, one can ask whether the 510(k) system gives the FDA the authority to require data submission or the authority to impose safety requirements
such as warnings or design requirements. The answer is yes.
Under 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a), the FDA can implement special controls applicable to all Class II devices of a certain type. These
special controls can include—as the FDA deems appropriate—
clinical data submissions, post market registries, design requirements, and labeling requirements. The FDA also has the
authority to impose performance standards if such a standard
“is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of the device.”268 These various control mechanisms are specific to the device type and are, by statutory definition,269 not the general controls at issue in Lohr. If necessary,
the FDA can even use general controls to ban unsafe 510(k) devices.270
Of course, technology evolves and Congress has addressed
that scenario as well. If the device has different technological
characteristics compared to the predicate, the 510(k) sponsor
must demonstrate that the device is still as safe and effective—
or they can be safer or more effective—as the predicate.271 Furthermore, companies cannot make safety-related changes to a
510(k) device without prior FDA clearance.272
The bottom line is that one is hard pressed to identify a
premarket or post-market requirement applicable to the device
that the FDA could not have imposed, had the FDA chosen to
do so. This includes clinical data requirements, design requirements, and labeling requirements. While one might disagree with what the FDA did or did not do, the fact remains that
FDA had the authority to do so. If the authority exists, preemption applies.
268. 21 U.S.C. § 360d(a)(1) (2006). The FDA can also require compliance
with recognized national or international standards such as ISO standards. 21
U.S.C. § 360d(c)(1)(A).
269. Special controls are separately defined by statute and are to be used
when general controls (the regulatory mechanism at issue in Lohr) are not sufficient to provide the reasonable assurance of safety required under the statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2006) (definition of general controls) and 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (definition of special controls).
270. 21 U.S.C. § 360f (2006).
271. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii).
272. 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a) (2011).
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As the above analysis demonstrates, the relevance of Lohr
today is highly questionable in light of the current statutory
framework and the FDA’s present implementation of the 510(k)
system. Today, the FDA makes safety and effectiveness determinations for 510(k) medical devices in determining the classification of the new device, compared to the predicate device,
and whether the new device is substantially equivalent or not
substantially equivalent. Due to this safety and effectiveness
finding, and if the device is found to be substantially equivalent, product liability claims asserted against 510(k) devices
may well actually impose additional or conflicting requirements
relating to the “safety and effectiveness of a medical device”
cleared under 510(k).273
There are two core reasons for preemption in “modern”
510(k) cases. First, additional safety and effectiveness requirements are preempted under § 360k(a) of the FDCA, which disallows state standards “relat[ing] to the safety and effectiveness of the device.”274 Secondly, additional or different safety
and effectiveness requirements at the state level hamper the
central facet of the FDA mission: to balance safety, effectiveness, and access to medical devices and to foster innovation.
Because a state court or jury can only address—and may well
be more concerned with—individual safety, they are not in a
position to balance the negative impacts of the additional or different requirements on other patients, do not have access to all
of the information available to the FDA, and are compelled to
impose additional or different safety requirements for medical
devices.275
Riegel accurately describes the PMA process as a federal
safety review, thereby pre-empting state claims relating to the
273. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). The “parallel claim” exception set forth
in Riegel would appear to be applicable to the 510(k)-based product liability
cases.
274. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2010) (stressing that state requirements relating to safety and effectiveness are pre-empted when the FDA “has
established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device”). The assessment of safety and
effectiveness in the 510(k) clearance process establishes a “specific counterpart
regulation” for that medical device.
275. A state is more concerned with issues at the individual level, and
therefore, places greater emphasis on the safety of the device. The FDA, on the
other hand, must consider the entirety of the nation and must ensure safety,
yet also promote medical device innovation as well. See Brief for Petitioner at
16, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886), 1996
WL 88789.
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safety or effectiveness of the medical device.276 The FDA now
has the authority to impose safety requirements on 510(k) devices, conduct a safety and effectiveness reviews for 510(k) devices, and as such, state claims imposing additional safety
standards should similarly be pre-empted. Arguably, if Medtronic’s Model 4011 Lead was cleared under today’s statutory
regime, a Court assessing a product liability suit against that
Lead should find the claim preempted.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we make two fundamental points relating to
preemption and 510(k) products. First, Lohr analyzed the
510(k) system as it existed thirty years ago. There have been
material changes in the 510(k) system since that time. Statutory interpretation cases should not be blindly followed if there
have been major changes in the statute since such decisions
were issued. That is precisely the case with Lohr. Because the
510(k) system has changed so much in the last thirty years,
Lohr must be reassessed. Second, a reassessment of Lohr based
on the current 510(k) system and current preemption law leads
to the conclusion that a 510(k) product cleared under the modern system may well be entitled to preemption.
The recent high level of attention on the 510(k) system has
brought renewed focus to the system and demonstrated that,
while perhaps not intuitive, the FDA has the authority to impose safety and effectiveness requirements on 510(k) products
and that the modern 510(k) system does, in fact, make safety
and effectiveness determinations.277 The system does this
through the initial classification process, the power to impose

276. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312–13 (2008) (concluding that
Mr. Riegel’s defective device claims were pre-empted by § 360k(a) because the
State’s requirements held Medtronic’s balloon catheter to a different safety
standard than the requirements placed by the FDA).
277. The recent FDA controversy involving the 510(k) clearance and then
withdrawal of ReGen Menaflex has brought into the limelight the lack of
knowledge by many about the current 510(k) system. In a preliminary report
of the ReGen Menaflex review, the FDA avowed: “[o]ur review identified multiple sources of disagreement and confusion about 510(k) standards and practices[.]” FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REVIEW OF THE REGEN MENAFLEX:
DEPARTURES FROM PROCESSES, PROCEDURES, AND PRACTICES LEAVE THE
BASIS FOR A REVIEW DECISION IN QUESTION 15 (2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/UCM183642.p
df.
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requirements through mechanisms such as “special controls,”
and then by the device-specific clearance decision—or nonclearance decision— under the “substantially equivalent” test.
While all agree that a 510(k) cleared device is “substantially equivalent” to a predicate, “substantial equivalence” is a
term of art under the FDCA and implementing regulations. As
such, it must be interpreted in light of how the statute defines
and uses that term. Unlike prior “substantial equivalence”
clearances, today’s substantial equivalence includes a finding
that the device is both safe and effective for its intended use.
Not only does Congressional purpose and statutory framework
surrounding § 360c establish the requirement of the safety and
effectiveness for 510(k) devices, but the FDA as well as other
persuasive authorities demonstrate that a safety and effectiveness determination is present in 510(k) decisions. This is shown
through the express findings of safety and effectiveness documented in the device’s clearance letter.
The standard applied in Lohr principally relied on the fact
that the safety and effectiveness of the implanted lead were not
accounted for prior to the device’s clearance. This finding is
now outdated and no longer applicable. The Court’s finding in
Riegel—in which product liability claims brought under state
law are preempted due to FDA’s authority to impose safety requirements and its prior determination of safety and effectiveness for the PMA device—should apply to 510(k) devices as
well.
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Appendix
Comparison of the 1976 statute with current statute.
Does Current
System Impose
More Safety or
Effectiveness
Requirements?
Yes

Current
360c(a)(
B) and
(C)(i)(II)

1976
513(a)(B)
Only required
that
there be
“sufficient information
to establish a
performance
standard”

The Secretary shall consider
whether the extent of data that
otherwise would be required for
approval of the application with
respect to effectiveness can be
reduced through reliance on
postmarket controls.

360c(a)
(3)(C)

Not in
1976
statute

Indirectly

The Secretary, upon written request, shall meet with a person
intending to submit application
under § 360e and determine the
type of scientific evidence necessary to demonstrate device’s effectiveness.

360c(a)
(3)(D)(i)

Not in
1976
statute

Indirectly

Any clinical data, including one
or more well-controlled investigations, specified in writing by
the Secretary for demonstrating
a reasonable assurance of device

360c(a)
(3)(D)(ii)

Not in
1976
statute

Yes

Requires the foregoing information to be available before a
device can be classified as
Class II:
Promulgation of performance standards;
Postmarket surveillance; Patient registries; Development and
dissemination of guidelines (including guidelines for the submission
of clinical data in premarket notification
submissions in accordance with 510(k)); and
Recommendations, and
other appropriate actions as the Section
deems necessary to
provide such assurance.
If not available, classified in Class III
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effectiveness shall be specified
as result of a determination by
the Secretary that such data are
necessary to establish device
effectiveness.
The Secretary may initiate the
reclassification of a device classified into Class III, or the manufacturer or importer of a device
classified under paragraph (1)
may petition the Secretary for
the issuance of an order classifying the device in Class I or
Class II.

360c(f)
(3)(A)

Not in
1976
statute

Yes

Upon determining that a petition does not contain any deficiency, the Secretary may refer
the petition to an appropriate
panel to make a recommendation to the Secretary respecting
approval or denial of the petition. A recommendation shall
contain:
a summary of the reasons for the recommendation;
a summary of the data
upon which the recommendation is based;
and
an identification of the
risks to health (if any)
presented by the device
with respect to which
the petition was filed.
In the case of a petition for a
device which is intended to be
implanted in the human body or
which is purported or represented to be for a use in supporting
or sustaining human life, the
panel shall recommend that the
petition be denied unless the
panel determines that the classification in Class III of the device is not necessary to provide
reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness.

360c(f)
(3)(B)(i)

Not in
1976
statute

Yes

